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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study & Criticism/)

Looking Back at the Big Debate in the Soviet Party in the 1920's - by Kung Hsin 1

Carry the Struggle Against Capitulationism Through to the End - by Lo Ssu-ting 6

(Li-shih Yen-chiu /Historical Research/)

The Victory of the Long March Is a Magnificent Song of Triumph for Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line - by Lin T'ien 12

The Huai River--Past and Present 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Study & Criticism, No. 1 January 14, 1976 45

* * *

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Looking Back at the Big Debate in the Soviet Party in the 1920's

by

Kung Hsin (宮欣)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 2, February 14, 1976)

The history of the international communist movement shows that every advance made by Marxism was marked by combat. The big debate in the Soviet Union, centering on the relations between politics and economics in the Bolshevik Party, in the early 1920's was a violent battle under the dictatorship of the proletariat between Marxism and opportunism and revisionism.

The victory of the 1917 October Revolution made the Soviet Union the first socialist state in the world. As a result of imperialist inroads from abroad and sabotage carried out by counter-revolutionary bandit groups at home, both industrial and agricultural production in the Soviet Union suffered serious dislocations. Large numbers of factories and mines were wrecked and railways and bridges damaged. This crippled the entire national economy. Pushing up the national economy would therefore contribute to the strengthening of Soviet political power and this became the pressing desire of the Soviet people. Not long after the October Revolution, Lenin placed on the agenda the great project of organizing socialist economic construction. He proposed the task of "using new methods to build an economic base that will have the most profound impact on the life of tens of millions of people." He pointed out: "Only after this task (the main and basic aspects) is resolved can it be said that Russia has become not only a Soviet republic but also a socialist republic."

However, on the question of how to accomplish this task a violent struggle between the two lines in the Bolshevik Party at once erupted at that time. Trotsky was the first to jump out and at the end of 1920 dished up a pamphlet entitled On the Role and Task of Trade Unions. Taking advantage of the Soviet people's urgent desire to revive the national economy and harboring ulterior motives, he called for fulfillment of "the new task stipulated in our Party program -- organize production." Moreover, he underlined the words "organize production." Trotsky then went about everywhere to preach the idea of creating "an atmosphere for production" "among the worker masses" so they would "dedicate themselves wholly to production." Unquestionably, he was promoting the revisionist trash of the theory of productive forces.

The views Trotsky outlined in his pamphlet challenged the Leninist line on fundamental issues. It is generally known that Lenin wrote in October 1919 the article "The Economics and Politics in the Era of Proletarian Dictatorship," in which he explicitly pointed out: "Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the exploiting classes, that is the

landlords and capitalists, have not altogether disappeared and probably will not vanish overnight. The exploiters have been routed, but they have not yet been wiped out." While Lenin stressed the existence of class struggle in socialist society and emphatically called for the dictatorship of the proletariat, Trotsky mentioned only "organization of production" and completely ignored any references to classes, class contradictions and class struggle or the dictatorship of the proletariat. How could this not arouse Lenin's indignation? In order to help the comrades of the whole Party make clear the cardinal issue of right and wrong on the question of the line, Lenin delivered speeches and wrote articles, including "On the Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes" and "More on the Trade Unions, the Present Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin." In these lectures and writings Lenin refuted Trotsky's seemingly "popular" slogan and incisively pointed out: "It is obviously wrong to attribute all this to our Party program 'prescribing' the task of organizing production to the trade unions." "The Party program has neither provided for the 'organization of production' nor proposed such a task to trade unions." Lenin said that the focal point of the present struggle was still one for consolidating or overthrowing Soviet political power. "Judging from the current basic task, we are doubtless correct, because without class struggle that aims at seizing state power it would be impossible to achieve socialism."

The correct line advanced by Lenin was based on a penetrating analysis of the class struggle situation at home and abroad that confronted Soviet Russia. After the proletariat captured political power, class struggle by no means ended. In many aspects it merely changed its form, becoming more brutal and more acute. The principal contradiction was still that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. It was precisely because of this that Lenin pointed out emphatically: "If a class fails to correctly handle its problems politically, it cannot maintain its rule and consequently cannot solve its production tasks." If we abandoned the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie and stressed "organization of production" all along in the manner of Trotsky, then there would be no way to revive and develop the socialist economy, the position of the proletariat would become untenable and the dictatorship of the proletariat, established with blood and sacrifice, would be lost.

Did Trotsky really care for production? Certainly not. Not only did he try to annul the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie through all-out effort to preach "organization of production" as the primary task, but used such a slogan to launch frenzied attack on the proletariat. On the pretext of making trade unions "serve production," Trotsky put forward the notorious program of "tightening the screws" and "chastising the employees associations" and clamored for the "militarization of the trade union itself." This was aimed at using compulsive military measures in the trade unions to "establish a kind of system whereby the laborer looks upon himself as a soldier who cannot freely plan his labor" If a worker did not do his work well, he "should be confined to a reformation or concentration camp." Trotsky even openly advocated imposing

"compulsory labor" on the workers. Lenin said rightly: "The spirit of the 'top-to-bottom castigation' policy permeates this programmatic pamphlet of Comrade Trotsky's from head to toe." According to Trotsky's "castigation" proposal, the worker only had the obligation to perform labor without any right to make revolution. This, in essence, meant exercising bourgeois dictatorship over the vast numbers of workers. This outrageous way to "chastise" the workers was aimed at eliminating the workers' revolutionary spirit and making them docile tools for carrying out the erroneous line.

In exposing the reactionary nature of Trotsky's "chastising" policy, Lenin pointed out incisively: Doing things according to Trotsky's view "would bring about the extinction of the dictatorship of the proletariat." In an effort to boost production, Lenin not only reiterated the need to unfold the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie but also proposed that representatives be selected from places where the dictatorship of the proletariat was most deeply rooted,that is, from among workers and poor peasants, to take part in state and enterprise management. Lenin personally drafted resolutions that explicitly called for the "display of the democratic and pioneering spirit, participation in industrial management and development of emulation drives and their incorporation into the trade union movement as a whole." On numerous occasions Lenin pointed out the inevitable existence among Soviet state organs and enterprise management establishments of capitalist vestiges such as bureaucratism. He asserted that only by drawing the broad masses to participate in state and enterprise management could firm proletarian leadership over the state and enterprises be assured and only then could the socialist economy be effectively developed.

It is clear that this disagreement between Lenin and Trotsky on the task of restoring the national economy and building socialism represented a basic antagonism between two opposing political lines. This was what Trotsky tried his best to cover up. After he was soberly taken to task by Lenin, he continued to defend himself by pretending that he "cares for production." He argued that, while Lenin viewed problems from the "political" aspect, he himself approached them from the "economic" aspect. At this juncture, Bukharin, another opportunist in the Party, assumed the stance of an "arbiter" standing aloof from the two contending parties. He declared in sensational terms that the Party was "drifting toward collapse like a train" and this tendency had to be "mitigated." He rallied ten Central Committee members to form a so-called "buffer group" and issue a "buffer program," which gave "equal value" to Lenin's "political" and Trotsky's "economic" approaches to problems. It asserted that "both principles are correct, and it is also correct to put them together," and that neither should be discarded. This program was so deceitful that at the outset many Central Committee members were duped by its wording. However, Lenin, displaying the revolutionary spirit of going against the tide, rode out this adverse opportunist current. After debunking the opportunist essence of "conciliatory" and "parity" utterances, he said: "By calling for combining the approaches of viewing things politically and economically, Bukharin thus theoretically stooped to the eclectic stand." According

to Lenin's analysis, Bukharin made the theoretical mistake of passing off eclecticism for the dialectical relationship between politics and economics. Bukharin considered himself to be a Marxist theoretician, yet he betrayed Marxism on this most essential point. For instance, "compared with economics, politics cannot but come first. Without affirming this point, one forgets the minimum common knowledge of Marxism." Yet, prating about "this and that" and "on the one hand, on the other hand," Bukharin made no mention of which was the principal, politics or economics. In fact he secretly replaced Marxist materialist dialectics with eclecticism.

The erroneous view of putting politics on a par with economics violates Marxist materialist dialectics in philosophy. It is consistent with dualism and the doctrine of equilibrium. Not only did Bukharin practice eclecticism on the question of the relationship between politics and economics, but he also promoted reconciliation in the struggle between the two lines within the Party and this laid bare his opportunist features. Speaking harshly and derisively of Bukharin, who appeared "fair-minded," Lenin said: "It would be very difficult for me to find a polite word to describe this sort of buffer. If I were as good as Comrade Bukharin in caricaturing, I would make a caricature of Comrade Bukharin in this manner: a person carrying a bucket of gasoline is pouring the oil on the fire, with the caption reading: 'Buffer Gasoline'." More than anything else, this exposed Bukharin's utterly hideous features as an accomplice of Trotsky. What he called "buffer" was false and the way he aided and abetted Trotsky's anti-Party behavior was real. It was alleged that Bukharin's nickname was "soft wax" -- implying that he was as pliant as wax and the views of different factions could be neutralized in his theories. However, at one Central Committee meeting where arguments were most vehement, Bukharin in his "buffer speech" spoke eloquently against Lenin and said nothing against Trotsky. Not long afterward, Bukharin rolled over to Trotsky's side altogether. Although Trotsky, stubborn and fanatical, and Bukharin, tricky and eclectical, resorted to different tactics, both were opportunists frenziedly opposed to Lenin, with the latter far more deceptive. In a furious outburst, Lenin said: "Bukharin has far 'surpassed' Trotsky and completely 'overshadowed' him." "The mistakes made by Bukharin are a hundred times bigger than the sum total of the mistakes committed by Trotsky."

Trotsky and his ilk pretended to be "concerned with production" but this gesture was entirely deceptive. They "took a step backward on the question of how to boost production." Exposing them, Lenin said angrily: "The political mistakes made by Comrade Trotsky and aggravated by Comrade Bukharin caused our Party to diverge from economic tasks and 'production' work and compelled us -- most regrettably -- to spend much time in rectifying these mistakes." Their anti-Party conduct brought about considerable interference to the revival of Soviet Russia's national economy. The one who truly attached real importance to the development of the socialist economy and production for the purpose of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat was Lenin. In struggling against these opportunists like Trotsky and Bukharin, Lenin outlined a whole set

of policy measures for socialist economic construction and drew up a grand scheme envisaging the electrification of the whole country within ten to twenty years. It was exactly under the guidance of Lenin's correct line that Soviet Russia's economy was speedily rehabilitated and developed substantially.

The big debate in the Soviet Party in the early 1920's, centering on the relationship between politics and economics, ended in victory for the Leninist line and defeat for the opportunist line. In repudiating such ringleaders of opportunist lines as Trotsky and Bukharin, Lenin emphatically pointed out: "We should bear in mind that a political leader should not only be responsible for his own policy but should assume the responsibility for the things done by those he leads." This not only distinguished the chieftains of the opportunist lines from those comrades working in the departments under their supervision, but also made it possible for those comrades who committed errors of line under deception to become once more acceptable, provided they gained some understanding and were willing to dissociate themselves from the erroneous line. This was helpful to isolating the chieftains of the opportunist lines and rallying the majority of comrades closely around the Leninist line. In March 1921, the 10th Congress of the Bolshevik Party made a summation of this big debate and adopted, by an overwhelming majority, the program and resolutions drafted by Lenin. However, both Trotsky and Bukharin continued to adhere to their reactionary stand and remained unrepentant despite Lenin's sober criticism. They continued to attack Lenin's correct line and policies, advocated the development of big industry by means of exploiting the peasants, and even favored the leasing of key industrial sectors to foreign capitalists. In view of their undisguised preaching of capitulationism and the doctrine of national betrayal, they were eventually dumped into the dustbin of history by the Soviet people led by Stalin.

Looking back at that big debate in the Soviet Party more than 50 years ago, we have clearly perceived that to preach the theory of the dying out of class struggle and the theory of productive forces and to practice eclecticism is to practice revisionism. On the other hand, to uphold Marxism, we must persist in taking class struggle as the key link, adhere to the dictatorship of the proletariat and firmly uphold materialist dialectics. Today, re-studying the historical experience of Lenin's struggle against the Trotsky-Bukharin opportunist line is helpful to us in uncovering the ferocious features of the revisionists at the end of their rope and catching their sinister hands attacking the proletariat.

* * *

Carry the Struggle against Capitulationism Through to the End

- Read "Importance Should Be Attached to the Discussion of the Film 'The Story of Wu Hsün'"

by

Lo Ssu-ting (罗思鼎)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 1, January 14, 1976)

Commenting on Water Margin is aimed at "helping all people recognize capitulationists," persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and carry the struggle against revisionism and capitulationism to its completion.

Criticizing "The Story of Wu Hsün" served as the first battle against capitulationism on the political and ideological front after the liberation. Chairman Mao attached prime importance to this struggle as he personally wrote an editorial for the Jen-min Jih-pao entitled "Importance Should Be Attached to the Discussion of the Film 'The Story of Wu Hsün'." In this editorial Chairman Mao pointed out right at the beginning: "The problems raised by 'The Story of Wu Hsün' are of a fundamental character." This referred to the film's praise of Wu Hsün's capitulationist line and negation of the line of peasant revolution. Lauding Water Margin and Sung Chiang is tantamount to making the same kind of mistake. During the socialist period, preaching capitulationism is in the last analysis a betrayal of the dictatorship of the proletariat, capitulating to the landlord and bourgeois classes at home and surrendering to imperialism and social-imperialism abroad. Chairman Mao pointed out solemnly: "Should we extol the hideous acts of displaying servility to the reactionary feudal rulers? Isn't this clear?" Every revolutionary fighter of the proletariat should not praise capitulationists nor recognize or tolerate praises of capitulationism.

For 20 years and more since the liberation, the capitulationist trend of thought has constantly made its appearance and the struggle against capitulationism has not ceased. In the early days of the founding of the PRC, Chairman Mao criticized "The Story of Wu Hsün" and "The Inside Story of the Ch'ing Court" which preaches national betrayal. In 1954 he wrote "Letter Concerning the Question of Studying the Dream of the Red Chamber," condemning the attempt to suppress criticism of Yü P'ing-po's "Studies of the Dream of the Red Chamber" and Hu Shih's reactionary thought and to surrender to reactionary bourgeois ideas. In 1957, Rightists within the Party first beat the "drums of films"--capitulationist drums, and launched attacks on the Party in coordination with international revisionists and bourgeois Rightists. Chairman Mao then led the people of the whole country to struggle against the bourgeois Rightists and capitulationism within the Party represented by Liu Shao-ch'i. After the Lushan Conference in 1959, Liu Shao-ch'i's bourgeois headquarters ordered the publication of Hai Jui Dismissed from Office for the purpose of reversing the verdict on P'eng Te-huai, the Right-deviating opportunist. Chairman Mao then personally initiated

criticism of Hai Jui Dismissed from Office, thereby raising the curtain of the great proletarian cultural revolution. The decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the great proletarian cultural revolution, that is, "16 Points," personally drawn up by Chairman Mao, explicitly pointed out: "The prime target of this movement is to purge those power-holders within the Party taking the capitalist road." Capitalist roaders are capitulationists. The current criticism of Water Margin likewise has been undertaken with Chairman Mao's affectionate solicitude. Every struggle against capitulationism led by him results in having greatly raised the Marxist level of the whole Party.

The appearance of the capitulationist trend of thought during the socialist period is inevitable as it is a reflection of class struggle in society and a product of the two-line struggle within the Party. To disintegrate the dictatorship of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie must certainly preach the idea of surrendering to the reactionaries who oppress the people. Both Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao were the biggest capitulationists during the socialist period. Since politically they pushed the revisionist line, theoretically they were bound to trumpet with frenzied efforts the theory of class reconciliation and become willing captives of the bourgeoisie. As a product of the revisionist line, the capitulationist trend of thought abets this reactionary line. Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao were chief backstage bosses of the capitulationist trend of thought.

The appearance of capitulationists and capitulationism within the revolutionary ranks must also be seen against the background of class struggle at home and abroad, the result of the influence of the policy of the counter-revolutionary class and the notions of the exploiting class. All decadent and declining reactionary classes are most afraid of the masses of the people rising in revolution, always doing their utmost to spread the theory of class reconciliation in a vain attempt to blur the revolutionary people's class consciousness, blunt their fighting zeal, lure and buy over the black sheep of the revolution. The bourgeois representatives who sneak into the Party, like Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, are the most dangerous enemies of the proletariat. When the revolution encounters difficulties and setbacks, they become pessimistic and despondent about the future of the revolution and display signs of wavering, compromising and surrendering. Lin Piao doubted "how long the red flag can remain hoisted" while Liu Shao-ch'i defected to the enemy and became a despicable renegade. When the revolution is developing in triumph, they accommodate the peaceful evolution tactics of "sending people in or pulling people out" adopted by reactionaries, and push the capitulationist line so as to disintegrate and bury the revolution from within.

A phenomenon worth looking into is that the several major capitulationist lines in the history of our Party all appeared at a time when the development of the revolution was excellent. In his article "Our Study and the Current situation," which sums up the experience of the two-line struggle within the Party, Chairman Mao cautioned the whole Party against "making the same mistakes of displaying arrogance in victory." He recalled that in 1927 when the Northern Expedition war reached a climax and "the expeditionary forces arrived in Wuhan, some comrades became arrogant, thinking highly of themselves

and forgetting the Kuomintang would attack us. As a result, they made the mistakes of the Ch'en Tu-hsiu line and caused the revolution to end in failure." "When the War of Resistance began and the united front was established, again some comrades became arrogant and thought highly of themselves. As a result, they made certain mistakes similar to those of the Ch'en Tu-hsiu line." This shows that capitulationism is likely to appear when the revolution encounters setbacks or enjoys plain sailing, with more damaging effects in the latter case. This is also true during the socialist period. The capitulationist trend of thought represented by "The Story of Wu Hsün" appeared at a time when New China was just established and the people's revolution against imperialism and feudalism had scored great victories. Liu Shao-ch'i at the time put forward the capitulationist political program of "consolidating the new democratic order," vainly trying to do away with the socialist revolution. After the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production was crowned with a great victory, Liu Shao-ch'i dished up the theory of the dying out of class struggle in a futile bid to abolish the dictatorship of the proletariat and capitulate to the bourgeoisie. Before and after the convening of the 9th Party Congress in 1969, at a moment when the great proletarian cultural revolution had won significant victories, Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta dished up the counter-revolutionary theory of productive forces to oppose the continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and to preach once again surrender to imperialism and the bourgeoisie. The appearance of capitulationism under victorious situations merits serious pondering.

The appearance and spread of capitulationism are invariably linked with the waxing and waning of class struggle. The deepening of the socialist revolution in its development also causes the deepening of the struggle against capitulationism. It is rather easy to recognize an undisguised capitulationist like Wu Hsün, who opposed the revolution by standing outside the revolutionary camp, since there is less deceit. With the deepening of the socialist revolution, to embellish and extol Sung Chiang's capitulationism carries increasingly dangerous implications. Sung Chiang differs from Wu Hsün in that he sneaks into the revolutionary contingent to usurp leadership power and push the capitulationist line, an approach characteristic of revisionism. In the excellent situation in which the Liangshan insurgent army had repeatedly trounced Tung Kuan and Kao Ch'iu, he transformed a revolutionary peasant force into an imperial army of the feudal court. He thus succeeded where the use of counter-revolutionary violence failed. Repudiating Sung Chiang the capitulationist therefore contributes to our recognition of the danger of the revisionist line to our revolution. Hence, criticizing Water Margin is an important aspect of combating and preventing revisionism on the political and ideological front.

The characteristics of class struggle at various historical stages of development of socialism determine the different forms of manifestation of capitulationism. Discussions around "The Story of Wu Hsün" during the early days of the PRC centered on the issue of establishing or not establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat and carrying out or not carrying out the socialist revolution. Chairman Mao in a solemn statement to the whole world declared: "Our nation will no longer be a humiliated nation. We have stood up." However, the advocates of "The Story of Wu Hsün" wanted the Chinese

people who had stood up to prostrate themselves again before imperialism and its lackeys and to take the beaten track of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The current campaign against capitulationism preached in Water Margin is a struggle to settle the issue of whether to carry through or stop halfway the continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. China is now in an important period of historical development. When we are determined to build a powerful socialist state and realize the four modernizations, whether or not we can keep to the dictatorship of the proletariat and persistently criticize capitulationism and revisionism is a cardinal matter relating to our country's development prospects. When Chairman Mao criticized Liu Shao-ch'i's revisionist line in 1965, he pointed out: "Throughout the period of transition there are class contradictions, the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and the struggle between the two roads, the socialist and capitalist. If we forget this basic theory and practice of our Party over the past decade and more, we will go astray." We must therefore firmly grasp class struggle as the key, persist in the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie, and combat capitulationism and revisionism of every description.

When a capitulationist trend of thought has been criticized, very often it may reappear. In combating capitulationism, we must not subscribe to the view that after a few or a dozen major struggles, we can sit back and relax. On the cardinal issue of right and wrong -- revolution or surrender, advance or turning back -- a Communist must take a clearcut stand and stick to principle. When a capitulationist trend of thought surges forth, we must be prepared to resist and struggle against it in the proletarian revolutionary spirit of going against the tide. From the criticism of "The Story of Wu Hsün" to commenting on Water Margin, whenever capitulationism is taken to task some people invariably are ill at ease. Therefore, it is not without benefit for us to mention again the mistakes of the patrons of "The Story of Wu Hsün."

In criticizing "The Story of Wu Hsün," Chairman Mao pointed his finger at the frenzied bourgeois attacks in the ideological sphere and the serious intellectual confusion in cultural circles. Castigating those who surrendered to bourgeois ideology, he pointed out most meaningfully: "What merits attention in particular is that there are some Party members who claim they have mastered Marxism. They have studied the history of social development -- historical materialism, but once they come across concrete historical events, concrete historical characters (like Wu Hsün), and concrete ideas that go against history (such as those in the film "The Story of Wu Hsün" and other works concerning Wu Hsün), they lose the power of criticism, with some even surrendering to such reactionary notions. Isn't it true that reactionary bourgeois ideas have got into the militant Communist Party? Where have certain Communists who claim they have mastered Marxism gone?" Such lessons of capitulating to reactionary ideas should be forever remembered by us. The capitulationist trend of thought is naturally highly deceptive, for under the condition of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it often dons the cloak of "historical materialism" and even unfurls the revolutionary banner to deceive the masses, making it difficult for them to recognize its true features. Besides, the capitulationist trend of thought follows a set course of growth and development, with public recognition of

it likewise following a course of continuous deepening. Identifying and repudiating one form of capitulationism does not mean ability to recognize and criticize all forms of capitulationism. Some people deserve to be called brave fighters when combating one form of capiutlationism, but when faced with another form of capitulationist trend of thought, they become its prisoners. Lessons of this sort are not lacking in history. This requires every revolutionary fighter to ponder over the serious problem of how to carry the struggle against capitulationism to its completion.

That some in the revolutionary contingent become captive of bourgeois ideas is, in the last analysis, still a question of class stand and world outlook. Some of them are fellow travelers carried along by the surging tide of the revolution, and when the revolution is deepening they think of "getting off on arriving at the station." Others succumb to deception and inducement and attack of sugar-coated bullets by reactionaries, and finally betray their own class and degenerate into capitulationists. Still others fail to persist in the study of Marxist-Leninist and Chairman Mao's works and fail to transform their world outlook, so they lack the power of discernment in respect of revisionism. Since they are not ideologically prepared to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the bourgeois kingdom still exists in their minds. Therefore, once the capitulationist trend of thought appears, they fall in with it instantly. This shows that if one is taken captive ideologically, in the long run he will be taken captive politically also. There is no unbridgeable gulf in between.

In his criticism of "The Story of Wu Hsün," Chairman Mao searchingly probed, from the plane of two kinds of historical conception, the fundamental ideological mistakes of the advocates of "The Story of Wu Hsün" and verified the ideological sources of capitulationism. Chairman Mao pointed out incisively: "In the view of many writers, the development of history is not substituting new things for the old but involves attempts to keep old things from becoming extinct; it is not the use of class struggle to topple the reactionary feudal rulers that should be overthrown, but negating class struggle by the oppressed people and surrendering to the reactionary feudal rulers in the manner of Lu Hsün. Our writers make no effort to study past history to identify those enemies who oppressed the Chinese people and to find out whether those who surrendered to and served these enemies are worth commending. Our writers also make no effort to study the things that occurred in China in the hundred years and more since the 1840 Opium War, the new social and economic conditions that were opposed to the old social and economic conditions and their superstructure (politics, culture, etc.), the new class forces, new personalities and new ideas, so they can determine what should and should not be commended or extolled and what should be opposed." Here the fundamental mistake of "The Story of Lu Hsün" and its patrons was thoroughly exposed, and that was the use of the revisionist theory of class reconciliation to reject the Marxist doctrine of class struggle.

For a long time, the erroneous viewpoint that was held over the study of Water Margin also should be basically attributed to the failure to approach problems from the viewpoint of class struggle and the struggle between the two lines. Once we forget class struggle as the key link, we will not be

able to make a clear distinction between the revolutionary line and the capitulationist line, and we may even defend the erroneous one. Both "The Story of Wu Hsün" and Water Margin are ideologically based on the theory of class reconciliation. The existence of various erroneous views in the study of Water Margin proves that Marxism has not totally occupied the dominant position in the ideological sphere and that the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat must continue to be implemented. Hence, commenting on Water Margin should be linked with "read and study conscientiously and have a good grasp of Marxism," particularly in relation to the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Recent strange notions that appeared during the Right-deivating wind to reverse verdicts on the educational front serve as a striking example of how the revisionist line opposes the proletariat on behalf of the bourgeoisie. This is also a manifestation of the capitulationist trend of thought in another form. Those who promote capitulationism invariably mean to maintain and restore the decadent old things, and oppose and hamper the growth of new revolutionary things. Sung Chiang was opposed to establishing the revolutionary political power of the peasants on Liangshan; Wu Hsün rejected and opposed the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal peasant revolution; and P'eng Te-huai opposed the great leap forward and the people's commune. Today, opposition of all sorts to new things can be concentrated on one point, that is, to oppose the proletariat exercising all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie and oppose the continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Like the various capitulationist tides since liberation, the Right-deviating wind to reverse verdicts on the educational front is an integral part of class struggle and line struggle in society. Both the 9th and 10th Party Congresses summed up the great proletarian cultural revolution. Yet there are always some people who want to settle scores with and negate the great cultural revolution. Disavowing the educational revolution means capitulating to the revisionist line on education that prevailed for 17 hears and to bourgeois ideology. The mass debate on the educational front once again attests to the necessity of repudiating the capitulationist trend of thought.

As long as classes and class struggle exist, the capitulationist trend of thought will not vanish of itself. Our Party has developed in the struggle to uphold Marxism and combat capitulationism. Historically, our Party criticized the capitulationism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-t'ao, and spurred the victory of the democratic revolution. During the socialist period it repudiated the counter-revolutionary revisionism and capitulationism espoused by Kao Kang, P'eng Te-hua, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, and promoted the continuous develpment of the socialist revolution. At every important juncture of the revolution, Chairman Mao has always reminded us to guard against the appearance of capitulationism and to carry the revolution to its completion! From criticizing "The Story of Wu Hsün" to commenting on Water Margin, the twists and turns in the struggle over the past 20 years and more tell us this truth: The struggle to combat capitulationism is a long-term fighting task of the proletariat. We must continue to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, unfold criticism of Water Margin, recognize the nature, target, task and future of the socialist revolution, consciously hold fast to the Party's basic line and policies during the historical period of socialism and carry the struggle against capitulationsim and revisionism to the very end!

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The Victory of the Long March Is a Magnificent Song of Triumph for Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line

by

Lin T'ien (林田)

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This year is the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Long March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In December 1935, not long after the Central Red Army, that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, triumphantly arrived in northern Shensi, Chairman Mao made an incisive summary of the Long March with these words: "The Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history,.... it is a manifesto, a propaganda force, a seeding-machine." "In a word, the Long March has ended with victory for us and defeat for the enemy. Who brought the Long March to victory? The Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, a long march of this kind would have been inconceivable." ("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism") It was precisely the Chinese Communist Party led by Chairman Mao that guided the Red Army in attaining the great victory of the Long March; it was precisely Chairman Mao's revolutionary line which, after defeating the opportunist lines of Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-t'ao, guided the Red Army to win this great victory. The great victory of the Long March is a magnificent song of triumph for Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.

During the 25,000 li march, the struggle waged by Chairman Mao's revolutionary line against the opportunist lines of Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-t'ao was exceedingly acute and extremely rich in content. This article attempts only to deal with several of the many issues involved.

(I) What Was the Fundamental Task of the Red Army's Long March? Where Did the General Orientation of the March Point To?

In October 1934, due to the harm done by Wang Ming's line, the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign failed, and the First Front Army of the Red Army had no choice but to leave the central revolutionary base area and break out to start a long march. Why did the Red Army have to do so? What was the fundamental task of the Long March? Where was it going? These were major problems to be urgently solved at that time; they were also major problems involving the struggle between Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and Wang Ming's line.

At that time, the representatives of Wang Ming's line who usurped the leadership of the Red Army threw a mysterious veil of secrecy over these vital issues. Not only did they fail to make them clear to the vast revolutionary masses, revolutionary cadres, and Red Army commanders and fighters, they even did not bring them up for discussion at meetings of the Central Committee's Political Bureau. But why all that secrecy?

The answer was that these self-styled "100 percent bolshevik" "heroes" were then already frightened to death by the planes and guns of the white army. Faced with these burning issues of the day, they were really unable to come forward with a positive and effective solution. Of course, they did have certain plans, but these plans were too rotten to face the light of day. A year before, when the Red Army was developing victoriously under the guidance of Chairman Mao's strategic thought, they had rejected Chairman Mao's leadership over the Red Army. Appearing pompous, they totally denied the fact that while the enemy was big and powerful, we were small and weak. They declared that the war waged by the Red Army against the white army was "a war waged by a big army against another big army." Therefore, when the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign started, they launched adventurist attacks in "resisting the enemy outside the nation's gates." In other words, they took the risk to launch attacks on the powerful enemy troops "outside the gates" of the revolutionary base area in an attempt to prevent the enemy forces from breaking into the revolutionary base area. When their adventurist attacks failed and the enemy troops poured through "the nation's gates," they turned to conservatism in defense. In face of the enemy's block-house advance, they "divided troops for separate defenses" and "resisted every step of the way," making the Red Army in an inferior position engage a much more powerful army in a superior position on an attrition basis. After a year of bitter fighting, the Red Army was almost exhausted, and "resisting every step of the way" became "retreating in defeat every step of the way." Now that the greater part of the land behind "the nation's gates" was seized by the enemy, they saw the tide was turning against them and hastily led the Red Army to break out and start the long march without making the necessary preparations. At this point, fearing the enemy as much as they feared the tiger, they over-estimated the strength of the enemy but under-estimated that of the Red Army. In their view, in the course of breaking through and undertaking the Long March, the Red Army basically could not afford to take the initiative to attack the enemy but could only avoid engaging the enemy and resort to flightism. To where? They intended to flee to western Hunan, the base area of the Second and Sixth Corps of the Red Army. If they had ever proposed any fundamental task for the Long March, then that was to move their "home" threatened by the enemy's gunfire from Kiangsi to western Hunan, where they could more safely "put down their luggage."

However, the intentions which the representatives of Wang Ming's line kept secret from the Party and Red Army were quickly revealed to Chiang Kai-shek by the very actions these people took during the initial phase of the Long March. Chiang Kai-shek just as quickly ascertained the mechanics behind their movements and knew that they were fleeing toward western Hunan. By keeping up a continuous telegraphic flow of information, Chiang Kai-shek and his generals were able to rather accurately pinpoint the area the Central Red Army had arrived and the direction of its advance. Consequently, several hundred thousand enemy troops from various directions were closing in on the Central Red Army marching toward western Hunan. They encircled, pursued and intercepted the Red Army. The wishful thinking of the representatives of Wang Ming's line produced exactly the opposite of what they were hoping for: they

tried to escape, but were unable to do so; they wanted to avoid battle, but still had to face it; they hoped to get to western Hunan, but did not seem to stand the chance. Under their command, the heroic Red Army, driven into the defensive and subjected to attack everywhere, found itself in an extremely dangerous position.

Chairman Mao resolutely opposed such strategic mistakes brought about by Wang Ming's line. Integrating Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolutionary war, Chairman Mao formulated for the Red Army a series of strategic and tactical principles, pointing out in unambiguous terms: The Red Army should "determine its strategic orientation correctly, oppose adventurism when on the offensive, oppose conservatism when on the defensive, and oppose flightism when shifting from one place to another." ("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War")

In January 1935, during the course of the Red Army's Long March, the resolution adopted at the Tsun-i Meeting in accordance with Chairman Mao's opinions repudiated the flightism of the early phase of the Long March and indicated clearly the fundamental task of the Red Army's Long March. The Resolution pointed out: When it became clear that there was only a very slim chance or even no chance at all of attaining decisive victories by continuing to fight on the interior lines in the central revolutionary base area, we should unhesitatingly change our strategic principle and undertake a strategic retreat in order to preserve the effective strength of the main forces of the Red Army; in the vast unfortified areas we should search for the opportunity to switch into counter-offensive, smash the "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and build new revolutionary base areas. However, the representatives of Wang Ming's line, while preparing to break out and start out on a long march, simultaneously ordered the Red Army to use all strength at its disposal to continue to defend the central revolutionary base area. They completely ignored the problems of preserving the effective strength of the Red Army, which was precisely the basis of the strategic decision to evacuate the central revolutionary base area. What was more important, in the eyes of the representatives of Wang Ming's line, the Red Army's move to break out and undertake the long march was basically not a resolute and militant action, but a panic take to flight, a house-moving operation. The basic strategic principle was not to seek to annihilate the enemy when necessary and in favorable circumstances, but to avoid battle. As a result, during its three-month campaign to break through the enemy's cordon, the Red Army was constantly nailed to the defensive, helplessly subjected to attack and unable to take the initiative to deal the enemy hard blows. The Red Army was unable to raise its morale but suffered from over-fatigue, and the number of drop-outs reached an unprecedented extent. All this prevented the Red Army in its strategic shift from accomplishing such fundamental tasks as establishing new revolutionary base areas and preserving its effective strength at a high level.

As one can see from the aforementioned Resolution, Chairman Mao believed that the Red Army's breakthrough to undertake the long march was definitely not a passive take to flight but a positive action with three fundamental tasks: first, to preserve the effective strength of the main force of the Red Army; second, to seek the opportunity to annihilate the enemy while on the run so as to shake off the enemy's pursuit and interception; and third, to establish new revolutionary base areas.

These three tasks put forward by Chairman Mao were interrelated and could not be separated. In the first place, the preservation of the effective strength of the main force of the Red Army was inseparable from wiping out the enemy. Just as Chairman Mao had repeatedly pointed out: "The object of war is none other than the preservation of oneself and destruction of the enemy." "Destruction of the enemy is primary and self-preservation secondary, because only by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one effectively preserve oneself." ("On Protracted War") During the early phase of the Long March, the representatives of Wang Ming's line did not understand this truth; they did not dare to annihilate the enemy but only wanted to escape, thinking that by doing so, they could "preserve oneself." But the result was exactly the opposite. In a matter of merely three months, over half of the 80,000-men Red Army was lost, and the remaining small half was also on the verge of destruction. Only after flightism was checked and, in accordance with Chairman Mao's strategic thinking, large numbers of the enemy were wiped out while on the move was the Red Army able to shake off the enemy's encirclement, pursuit and interception and really preserve its effective strength.

The problem of establishing new revolutionary base areas in the course of the Long March was thus also a problem of where the Red Army should secure its footholds at the end of its long march, a problem involving the general orientation of its advance.

The nationwide political situation underwent new changes after the Tsun-i Meeting: the Japanese imperialists initiated new aggression against northern China, and the anti-Japanese democratic movement attained new development; the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army was victoriously smashing the enemy's six-route encirclement campaign in the Szechwan-Shensi border region. In view of this situation, Chairman Mao proposed that the Red Army march north to resist Japanese aggression, thereby indicating the general orientation of the Red Army's advance. In order to persevere in this general orientation, Chairman Mao led the Red Army to make the utmost efforts.

Toward the close of January 1935, the First Front Army of the Red Army drove north from the Tsun-i region, preparing to cross the Yangtze River to join forces with the Fourth Front Army in the Szechwan-Shensi border region and then march north together to resist the Japanese aggressors. After taking many detours, the First Front Army reached the Maokung region of Szechwan in May and joined forces with the Fourth Front Army. In June, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee met at Lianghok'ou. According to Chairman Mao's proposals, the meeting

correctly analyzed the political situation of the whole country at that time and clearly indicated: The strategic principle after the First and Fourth Front Armies had joined forces was to concentrate the main forces to drive north to found the Szechwan-Shensi-Kansu revolutionary base area, which was to be taken as the basis for inspiring the revolutionary movements in the northwestern provinces and even throughout the country. Thus, Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee further pointed out the general orientation of the Red Army to continue its northward push to resist the Japanese.

The purpose of continuing the northward push was to be near the front of resistance against Japan in preparation for direct attacks against the Japanese aggressors and to lead the democratic anti-Japanese movement across the country. And only by continuing to push north and establishing new revolutionary base areas could the Red Army secure its footholds and a starting point to open up a new revolutionary situation. Therefore, continuing to push north was the only correct general orientation of the Red Army during its Long March. However, this move was opposed by Chang Kuo-t'ao, who usurped leadership of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army at the time. Chang, already scared out of his wits by the Kuomintang's "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, was pessimistic and despondent about the future of the revolution. As early as March 1935, he had abandoned the Szechwan-Shensi revolutionary base area and took to flight down south toward the national minority regions in Szechwan and Sikang. After the First and Fourth Front Armies had join d forces, he still stubbornly persisted in his original flightist plans and continued to advocate retreating either to the Szechwan-Sikang border or to the remote border areas of the Northwest. These infertile and scantily populated areas were far away from the anti-Japanese front in North China and completely cut off from the nationwide democratic anti-Japanese movement, which was growing day by day. To flee to these places could only lead to the defeat of the Red Army and the revolution. This was clearly illustrated by the failure of the Western-route army later organized by Chang Kuo-t'ao on his own authority. Hence, whether to march north to resist the Japanese or to take to flight down south--this was an issue that had a bearing on the future and destiny of the Chinese revolution.

Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee firmly opposed the reactionary orientation of Chang Kuo-t'ao's flight to the south, and led the main force of the Central Red Army to continue to march north. On October 1935, they victoriously arrived at the Shensi-Kansu border region, the goal of the Red Army's Long March. There they joined forces with the Northwest Red Army and the 25th Army of the Red Army which had arrived earlier. In December, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee met at Wayaopao in northern Shensi. Both at and after this meeting, Chairman Mao, while systematically dealing with the characteristics of the political situation at the time and the tactical line of the struggle by the Party to set up an anti-Japanese national united front, dwelt also on the great significance of the Red Army's Long March. Moreover, he pointed out explicitly: "A new situation arose as soon as the Long March

was over. In the battle of Chihlochen* the Central Red Army and the Northwestern Red Army, fighting in fraternal solidarity, shattered the traitor Chiang Kai-shek's campaign of 'encirclement and suppression' against the Shensi-Kansu border area and thus laid the cornerstone for the task undertaken by the Central Committee of the Party, the task of setting up the national headquarters of the revolution in northwestern China." ("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism")

A year later, in October 1935, the Second Front Army and the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, following the instructions of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, undertook their long march and arrived in the Shensi-Kansu border area -- seat of the national headquarters of the revolution.

Why did Chairman Mao insist on setting up the national headquarters of the revolution in the Shensi-Kansu border region (which was soon to expand into the Shensi-Kansu Ninghsia border region)? Why did the Shensi-Kansu border region become the only general orientation of the Long March undertaken by the three main forces of the Red Army in the whole country and the ultimate foothold of the Long March? This was a wise policy decision made by Chairman Mao after he had trekked through the length and breadth of eleven provinces in the course of the Long March and conducted a penetrating investigation and study of the nationwide political situation, the situation in various provinces and the characteristics of the Shensi-Kansu border region. History confirms: this wise policy decision played a tremendous role in inspiring the Red Army's Long March and the subsequent course of the Chinese revolution. The nationwide political situation and the characteristics of the Shensi-Kansu border region at that time were as follows:

First, after the North China Incident in 1935, as the Japanese imperialists were intent to turn China into a colony under their sole domination, the national contradiction between China and Japan clearly became the principal contradiction, while the contradictions between China and all other imperialist states besides Japan and the class contradictions in China itself declined into a secondary and subordinate position. North China at that time was virtually in a state of occupation or semi-occupation by the Japanese aggressors, and the areas around Shensi and Kansu were also seriously threatened by the Japanese aggressors. Accordingly, North China and the Shensi-Kansu areas were where this principal contradiction -- the national contradiction between China and Japan -- assumed more serious dimensions. In these places, the vast masses of workers, peasants, students and all patriotic personages unwilling to become slaves of a foreign nation were already stirring in a mass upsurge of the anti-Japanese democratic movement. Under the impact

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* For a description of this battle, please see Wu Yün-hsiang, "Song of Triumph for Unity in Battle," SPRCT, No. 858, p. 29.

of this situation, the Northeast Army and the Northwest Army of the Kuomintang stationed in these areas, including their senior generals Chang Hsüeh-liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng, were voicing ever stronger demands for resisting the Japanese.

Second, "having shifted to the Northwest, the Red Army now no longer holds a vital position threatening the internal enemy as it did in the south, and as a result, the scale of the 'encirclement and suppression' campaigns has become smaller, the situation simpler and the fighting less intense." ("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War")

Third, the three main forces of the Red Army were originally dispersed in the various base areas lying north and south of the Yangtze River, with the Red Army in northern Shensi operating even more so on its own. "Because of our failure to smash the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' campaign and because of this great fluidity, the Red Army and the base areas have been greatly reduced, but we have planted our feet in the Northwest and consolidated and developed the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region, our base area here. The three front armies which form the main forces of the Red Army have been brought under a unified command, which is unprecedented." (Ibid.)

In a word, the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region at that time was a place where the strength of counter-revolutionary rule was relatively weak and that of the revolution was not only relatively strong but also could be developed substantially. It was a base area in which the Red Army in northern Shensi had been operative for many years and there was a fine revolutionary mass foundation; here, seriously threatened by the Japanese aggressors, the broad masses of people had an urgent desire to resist the Japanese. It was a place where the Red Army had the chance to win over the biggest anti-Japanese friendly armies -- the Northeast and the Northwest Armies. It was far away from Chiang Kai-shek's ruling centers of Shanghai, Nanking and Wuhan, and so the strength of the Kuomintang reactionary rule was relatively weak. It was very near the anti-Japanese front in North China, but it was not the prime target of Japanese imperialist aggression. It could be a reliable rear and a favorable advance position of the Red Army in resisting the Japanese. It was precisely because of these favorable objective conditions that the three main forces of the Red Army, having arrived here after a long march and under the unified command of the great leader Chairman Mao, integrated themselves closely with the anti-Japanese democratic movement of the broad masses of people and maintained friendly ties with the vast numbers of officers and men of the Northeast and Northwest Armies calling for resistance against Japan to become, in the real sense of the word, the central force and mighty pillar of the Party in its struggle to establish an anti-Japanese national united front. During the ever surging anti-Japanese democratic movement the Red Army also grew and expanded. By the time the War of Resistance Against Japan broke out in 1937, the Red Army swiftly moved to the anti-Japanese front in North China and became the main force of armed resistance of the Chinese people against the Japanese,

the backbone for opening up a great number of anti-Japanese base areas in North and Central China. It performed greater exploits than when it was fighting in scattered places south and north of the Yangtze and made greater contributions to the Chinese revolution.

The historical facts cited above show that when the three main forces of the Red Army abandoned the revolutionary base areas north and south of the Yangtze River and broke out to undertake the long march, it was an evil consequence caused by the lines espoused by Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-t'ao and was to have been a negative and passive move. But once the general strategic decision to march toward the Shensi-Kansu border region was taken and realized, what was originally a negative action turned into an historical torrent actively pushing the Chinese revolution forward to greater progress. The Long March of the Red Army turned from a strategic retreat into a great strategic advance toward the anti-Japanese forward position. This was a shining example of Chairman Mao's revolutionary art of leadership, a great victory for Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.

(II) What Was the Fundamental Task of the Long March Realized? How Did the General Orientation of Advance Persist ?

As previously mentioned, the fundamental task of the Long March set by Chairman Mao was to preserve the effective strength of the main force of the Red Army and to annihilate the enemy so as to shake off the enemy's encirclement, pursuit and interception; it was to firmly advance in this strategic general orientation toward the Shensi-Kansu border area. What strategy should the Red Army with only a few tens of thousands of men use to preserve itself while striking at the enemy who was trying to encircle, pursue and intercept it with several hundred thousand troops, and at the same time stick to the correct general orientation of advance? This was another vital issue of the struggle between Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and Wang Ming's line during the Long March.

In October 1934, the representatives of Wang Ming's line organized massive columns of the Military Affairs Commission and many other logistics organs and, taking along their belongings and heavy military equipment, set out from the central revolutionary base area under the cover of the main force of the Red Army. They advanced along a straight route toward western Hunan, the base area of the Second and Sixth Corps of the Red Army. Chiang Kai-shek, quickly discovering the intentions of the Red Army to advance toward western Hunan, reinforced his forces along the route followed by the Red Army and tightened up his blockade. After a month of bitter fighting, the Red Army broke through three enemy blockade lines. Chiang Kai-shek hastily transferred a big army of four hundred thousand men, which, with the help of the natural barrier of the Hsiang River, constituted the fourth blockade line. In late November 1934, when the Red Army was proceeding toward the Hsiang River, enemy planes dropped some leaflets, which blatantly declared: "By order of the General Commander, we've been waiting for you for a long time. Please come quickly. Come! Come! Come! Come into the dragnet we have prepared for you!" Faced with such

grave conditions, the representatives of Wang Ming's line still ordered the Red Army to attack and fight regardless of the odds in an attempt to force their way through. In order to get the massive columns of the Military Affairs Commission and other logistics organs across the Hsiang River and beat the blockade, they unscrupulously used all main force of the Red Army to provide a corridor-type cover on both flanks. Due to the bloody fighting by the vast numbers of commanders and fighters of the Red Army, the dragnet put up by the enemy was smashed and the fourth blockade broken. But the Red Army also paid a disastrously high price. The eighty thousand men who set out from Kiangsi were reduced to thirty thousand. In December, the Red Army reached the Hunan-Kweichow border. The representatives of Wang Ming's line still clung to their original plan and asked the Central Red Army to keep pushing toward western Hunan to join forces with the Second and Sixth Corps. To forestall this joining of forces of the Red Army, Chiang Kai-shek amassed 15 divisions, totalling four hundred thousand men, to set up another dragnet along the line of Chinghsien, Suining, Ch'engpu and Wukang. If the Central Red Army should fall into it, the whole army could be wiped out. At this critical juncture, Chairman Mao made a penetrating analysis of the war situation and firmly insisted on changing the stupid method of advancing along a straight route and, instead, diverting the advance toward Kweichow where the military strength of enemy was weak. In doing so, the Red Army would be able to gain the initiative, fight a few winning battles and give its main forces, which had trekked thousands of miles and fought bitter battles for several months on end, a chance to rest and consolidate itself. This wise proposal of Chairman Mao's won the approval of the majority of comrades of the Central Military Affairs Commission. And so, the Red Army changed course and advanced toward Kweichow. It took Lip'ing at one stroke. At Lip'ing, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee met and the majority of the comrades present also endorsed Chairman Mao's decision. After the meeting, the Red Army continued to thrust deep into Kweichow. In January 1935, it made a forced crossing of the Wu River and took the city of Tsun-i.

At Tsun-i, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held an enlarged session. Most of the comrades attending the meeting realized from their own personal experience that under Chairman Mao's leadership, the Red Army and the revolutionary base areas grew from nothing and then from small to big, successively crushing four large-scale campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" launched by the enemy and bringing about an increasingly better revolutionary situation. When Wang Ming and his associates rejected Chairman Mao's military line and replaced it with a "Left" military line, the war against the enemy's fifth campaign of "encirclement and suppression" ended in defeat. In the course of the Long March, the Red Army again lost the greater part of its men and faced the danger of total destruction. Who could save this precarious situation? Only the great leader Chairman Mao! Only the great leader Chairman Mao's wise leadership! The Tsun-i Meeting concentrated its efforts to criticize the mistakes of Wang Ming's line both militarily and organizationlly, a move which had a decisive significance at the time. It reaffirmed Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, and reorganized the Party Secretariat and the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee. The meeting put an end to the rule of Wang Ming's line over the Party Central Committee and

established Chairman Mao's leading position in the whole Party. It brought the Party line onto the Marxist-Leninist orbit, rescued the Party and the Red Army at the most critical moment, and insured the accomplishment of the fundamental tasks of the Long March, enabling the Chinese revolution to go from victory to victory. This was a turning point of great historical significance in the history of the Chinese Communist Party.

At Tsun-i, in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, the Red Army rested and consolidated itself for 12 days, during which it was trimmed of its heavy equipment and reorganized. The bulky luggage was thrown aside. The massive column of the Military Affairs Commission and other logistics organs were retrenched and simplified, and the combat forces reinforced. This made it possible for the Red Army to flexibly adapt itself to all kinds of situations and carry out all kinds of emergency tasks during large-scale mobile operations it was to undertake later.

After the Tsun-i Meeting, the most serious problem facing the Red Army still was this: How could it preserve itself and annihilate the enemy while being encircled, pursued, and intercepted by several hundred thousand enemy troops? Since it was not going to western Hunan, where should it go? As mentioned previously, Chairman Mao, basing himself on the prevailing situation, decided to lead the Red Army to cross the Yangtze to the north to join forces with the Fourth Front Army and then proceed with it to the north to resist the Japanese. History confirms that the establishment of this strategic general orientation was most correct and had a great bearing on the progress of the Chinese revolution. But the road leading to this strategic general orientation was not without twists and turns and reverses, primarily because the Red Army in its advance had to face obstruction by several hundred thousand troops under Chiang Kai-shek.

Toward the end of January 1935, the First Front Army marched north from Tsun-i and crossed the Ch'ihshui River via T'ungtzu and Hsishui with a view to getting across the Yangtze River at a point between Luchou and I-pin in Szechwan in its northward march. This move of the Red Army gave the enemy cause for great alarm. The Szechwan warlord Liu Hsiang, dreading the Red Army's presence in Szechwan, hastily put up defenses along the Szechwan-Kweichow border and blockaded the Yangtze River with a force of 36 regiments in an effort to prevent the Red Army from crossing the River. At the same time, two columns of the Kuomintang's "Central Army" under Chou Hun-yüan and Wu Ch'i-wei respectively as well as warlord forces in Hunan, Yunnan and Kweichow raced toward the point where the Red Army was preparing to cross the River. With the converging of large numbers of enemy troops in that direction, Chairman Mao decided to put off the plan of crossing the Yangtze to proceed north and instead, made a sudden turn eastward. In mid-February the Red Army re-crossed the Ch'ihshui River and re-took Loushan Pass and Tsun-i, destroying two divisions of the Kweichow warlord Wang Chia-lieh. Next, the bulk of the two divisions under Wu Ch'i-wei's column that rushed in as reinforcements were annihilated southwest of Tsun-i. During this campaign, a total of 20 enemy regiments were annihilated, marking the first big victory scored by the Red Army since the Long March.

The defeat led Chiang Kai-shek to believe that his generals were incompetent, and so he decided to go to Kweiyang to supervise the fighting personally. He adjusted the deployment of troops and directed them to march in various routes against the Red Army operating near Tsun-i. In order to further keep the enemy troops on the run, Chairman Mao in mid-March again led the Red Army to turn west from Tsun-i. After crossing the Ch'ihshui River for a third time, the Red Army then entered southern Szechwan again to pose for a crossing of the Yangtze. This time, Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Red Army was really intent on crossing the River, so, making another adjustment of his troop deployment, hastily ordered his troops of various routes to rush to southern Szechwan to set up an encirclement ring. When the enemy forces were converging on the western front, Chairman Mao again directed the Red Army to turn around and drive east. In late-March it crossed the Ch'ihshui River for a fourth time. Then it crossed the Wu River to the south and in April feinted an offensive against Kweiyang. At this time, with the Kuomintang's troops mostly located far away on the western front, the defending forces in Kweiyang were weak. Panic-stricken, Chiang Kai-shek had no alternative but to airlift the nearest stationed Yunnan Army to "protect the emperor." When planning for this move, Chairman Mao had pointed out that if only the Yunnan Army were lured out of their stronghold, that in itself would be a victory. As expected, the enemy acted entirely as if Chairman Mao were directing him. As a result, the Red Army and the Yunnan Army moved in opposite directions. As the Yunnan Army marched northeast to rescue Kweiyang, the Red Army turned southwest, thrust into Yunnan, and feinted an attack on Kunming. Seeing that the Red Army was marching in and his main forces had gone to Kweiyang, the Yunnan warlord Lung Yün was so worried that he had no choice but to summon the civilian corps from all over the province to Kunming. The Red Army took the opportunity and moved quickly northwest. It made an ingenious crossing of the Chinsha River in early May and drove into the Huili region in Szechwan. From then on, the Red Army shook off the encirclement, pursuit and interception by several hundred thousand enemy troops, and won a victory of decisive significance in the course of its strategic shift.

When the Red Army was making its four crossings back and forth the Ch'ihshui River, Lin Piao obdurately opposed Chairman Mao's strategic thinking on mobile warfare and many times refused to carry out Chairman Mao's operational orders. He slanderously accused Chairman Mao of "giving the wrong orders" and "undermining the armed forces." In a telephone call to P'eng Te-huai, he said: "The present leadership is not good; you should come out to command." He also wrote to the Party Central Committee demanding that Chairman Mao be relieved of his post. Therefore, after the Red Army crossed the Chinsha River and broke loose from the enemy's chase and interception, the Party Central Committee held a meeting at Huili, during which it criticized Lin Piao and smashed Lin Piao's plot to collude with P'eng Te-huai to seize power.

From the first crossing of the Ch'ihshui River to the ingenious crossing of the Chinsha River and from latter opposing Chang Kuo-t'ao's flightist line of retreating to the south to firmly proceeding to the north and arriving at Shensi-Kansu border region, it took altogether ten months. During those ten months, the general strategic orientation of the Red Army

to go to the north to fight the Japanese remained unaltered. However, minor orientations were changed many times; especially during the campaign in which the Ch'ihshui River was crossed four times, changes were most numerous and decided upon in the quickest manner. The enemy had thought that the Red Army was going to cross the Yangtze in southern Szechwan and go north, but the Red Army veered back to attack Tsun-i; the enemy had thought that the Red Army was heading east to attack Kweiyang, but the Red Army marched west to strike at Yunnan and make its ingenious crossing of the Chinsha River. The Red Army, making a feint to the east while striking in the west and moving south and north in a blitz fashion, just caught the enemy completely by surprise, such that the enemy found it impossible to stop the Red Army's advance. Just as Chairman Mao said: "Though the main direction does not change in a given period of time, within its ambit the secondary directions may shift at any moment; when we find ourselves checked in one direction, we must turn to another." ("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War") This was how Chairman Mao dialectically handled the relationship between the main direction and the secondary directions during the Long March: In order to adhere firmly to the general orientation of the advance, it is necessary to constantly change the secondary directions; constantly changing the secondary directions is precisely for the sake of keeping to the general orientation of advance; the general orientation is not made up of secondary directions that run in a straight line, but of many continuous but entirely different secondary directions that run in twists and turns. It was after going through countless twists and turns that the Red Army persisted in the only correct general orientation of crossing the Yangtze and marching north to resist the Japanese aggressors. This formed a sharp contrast to the situation in which the representatives of Wang Ming's line foolishly advanced toward western Hunan along a straight route only to be dealt disastrous blows by the enemy and the situation in which Chang Kuo-t'ao took to flight down south.

During the Long March Chairman Mao dialectically handled the relationship between the general orientation and the secondary directions and at the same time also solved the Red Army's fundamental task of preserving itself and destroying the enemy in the course of the Long March.

In the ten months from the first crossing of the Ch'ihshui River to the ingenious crossing of the Chinsha River to eventually arriving at the Shensi-Kansu border region, Chairman Mao many times shifted the secondary directions for the Red Army's advance, keeping the enemy on the run and disrupting his dispositions on the one hand and concealing the intentions of the Red Army and enabling it to adhere firmly to the general orientation of advance on the other. Particularly, during the four crossings of the Ch'ihshui River, the Red Army, under the wise command of Chairman Mao, maneuvered between the three provinces of Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow, travelling thousands of miles east and west and moving south and north many times. So flexible and mobile was the Red Army that the enemy was totally unable to ascertain its intentions, but could only blindly follow its false moves. Every time the Red Army moved, the enemy had to re-deploy his forces. But when the enemy had completed his re-deployment, the Red Army would have moved to some other place. When the enemy thought the Red Army had gone to a distant area, the Red Army would suddenly appear before them like flying generals, take them by complete surprise, and annihilate them swiftly.

Conversely, when the enemy believed that the Red Army was about to attack and made preparations to encircle and annihilate it, they would discover that it had gone. It was in this way the Red Army conducted its offensive campaigns and battles during its strategic retreat, and fought campaigns and battles of quick decision during the course of the protracted strategic war. While forcing the enemy to shift from an active position to a passive position, the Red Army shifted from a passive to an active position. The enemy wanted to strike at the Red Army but could not do so, yet the Red Army was able to seek out the opportunities to strike at the enemy harshly. Though encircled, pursued, and intercepted by several hundred thousand enemy troops, the Red Army not only preserved its effective strength but destroyed large numbers of the enemy's effective strength, victoriously accomplishing the fundamental task of preserving itself and wiping out the enemy during the Long March. This formed another sharp contrast to the situation in which the representatives of Wang Ming's line resorted to flightism and avoided battle in all circumstances during the Long March, forcing the Red Army into helpless passivity and subjecting it to enemy attacks everywhere, resulting in the loss of the greater part of its forces, and to the situation in which Chang Kuo-t'ao's flightist line eventually brought defeat to the Western Route Army. This was a great victory for Chairman Mao's strategic thinking, a great victory for his military line.

(III) How Did We Unite To Win the Great Victory of the Long March Under the Guidance of Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line?

To forge unity or practice a split? This was another important issue of the contention between Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and the lines of Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-t'ao during the Red Army's Long March.

Represented by Wang Ming, the "Left" opportunists took a sectarian stand and indiscriminately and erroneously levelled at all cadres who did not agree with or refused to carry out their erroneous line such charges as promoting "Right opportunism," "the rich-peasant line," "the Lo Ming line," "the line of compromise" and "double-dealing tactics." These cadres were "ruthlessly struggled against and merciless attacked," thereby seriously disrupting the Party's principle of democratic centralism and undermining the unity of the Party. Represented by Chairman Mao, comrades who adhered to the correct line opposed and demanded correction of this erroneous line, and consequently they were relieved of their leading positions in the Party and the Red Army by the "Left" opportunists. However, in practical work, Wang Ming's line continued to suffer from setbacks, and particularly after its failure during the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, the mistakes of this line began to be apparent to many leading cadres and Party members in general, arousing their suspicion and dissatisfaction. With the serious setbacks suffered by the First Front Army during the initial phase of the Long March, such suspicion and dissatisfaction grew even more, so much so that some comrades who had committed "Left" errors and took the sectarian stand also began to wake up and perceive that Wang Ming's line was militarily wrong and Chairman Mao's military line was correct. On the one hand, Chairman Mao stuck to principle and persisted

in struggle; on the other, he was also very good at uniting with the overwhelming majority. He was good not only at uniting with those who agreed with him but also at uniting with those who thought differently and with those who opposed him before and who had since been proven wrong by practice. He expressed warm welcome for these comrades who had committed "Left" mistakes, had taken a sectarian stand, but who now began to wake up, and thus everyone who could be united was united.

After leading the Party and the Red Army in defeating the Wang Ming line, Chairman Mao unfolded struggle against the flightist and splittist line of Chang Kuo-t'ao.

In May 1935, the First Front Army smoothly passed through the I nationality region, raced across the Tatu River, and seized the Luting Bridge, shattering the dream of the Kuomintang reactionaries who wanted to wipe out the Red Army on the banks of the Tatu River. In June, the First Front Army crossed the Tahsüeh Mountains, arrived at the Maokung region in Szechwan, and there joined forces with the Fourth Front Army. As mentioned earlier, after the First and Fourth Front Armies joined forces, the struggle between Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and Chang Kuo-t'ao's flightist line was acutely reflected in the struggle of whether to march north to resist Japanese aggression or to take to flight down south. Closely connected with this struggle was the issue of whether to practice unity or splittism. In August 1935, at the meeting held by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at Maoerhkai, while the struggle against Chang Kuo-t'ao's flightist line went on, his conspiracy to undermine the unity between the First and Fourth Front Armies was also exposed. It was sharply pointed out that the fraternal solidarity between the First and Fourth Front Armies was a prerequisite to the opening up of the Szechwan-Shensi-Kansu revolutionary base areas, and all tendencies to disrupt either intentionally or unintentionally the unity and solidarity of the First and Fourth Front Armies were harmful to the Red Army and helpful to the enemy. Following the meeting, the First and Fourth Front Armies mixed their units and regrouped and then marched north by two routes, left and right. Chang Kuo-t'ao, on the strength of his having a larger number of soldiers and guns, then openly tried to split the Party and the Red Army and brazenly rejected Central Committee's orders to march north to resist the Japanese. He even attempted to threaten the Party Central Committee with armed force. Seeing that Chang Kuo-t'ao possessed more men and guns, Lin Piao shamelessly exalted him, saying: If Chang Kuo-t'ao's "line is wrong, why does he have so many men?" Chairman Mao promptly decided and resolutely led the units of the right-route army which formerly belonged to the First Front Army to march north; finally, in October 1935, they reached northern Shensi and victoriously completed the Long March.

After the open split, Chang Kuo-t'ao took his units south and openly set up a separate "Central Committee" with himself as "chairman." But the correct leadership of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee had made a deep impact on the Fourth Front Army, and the large numbers of cadres, Party members and rank and file of this army rejected a split. Meanwhile, the units turning down south were struck not only by the class enemy but also by harsh natural conditions, resulting in great losses and making things very

difficult for Chang Kuo-t'ao. Under these circumstances, in June 1936, the Second Front Army made up of the Second and Sixth Corps of the Red Army shifted from the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechwan-Kweichow base area to the Kantzu region of Szechwan to join forces with the Fourth Front Army. Under the correct leadership of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, the Second Front Army waged a struggle against Chang Kuo-t'ao. The commanders and fighters of the Fourth Front Army were even more dissatisfied with the splittist activities of Chang Kuo-t'ao, who was forced to dissolve his bogus central committee. Subsequently, the comrades of the Fourth Front Army, acting against Chang Kuo-t'ao's wishes, moved north together with the Second Front Army, and in October 1936, they arrived at the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region where they triumphantly joined forces with the First Front Army. The western-route army organized by Chang Kuo-t'ao on his own authority was soon completely defeated. Chang Kuo-t'ao's conspiracy to split the Party and the Red Army finally ended in shameful bankruptcy.

During the struggle to overcome Wang Ming's and Chang Kuo-t'ao's opportunism, sectarianism and splittism, Chairman Mao patiently exhorted the Party and the Red Army that all people, regardless of which mountain stronghold or front army they belonged to and no matter whether they came from the north or from the south, must all unite under a common revolutionary goal. It was precisely by following these teachings of Chairman Mao's that, during the Long March, the great revolutionary unity within the Party and the Red Army was immensely strengthened. The cadres and fighters of the Red Army cared for, loved and helped each other. They shared woe and weal, lived and died together, and were concerned more about others than themselves. In the course of the Long March, many senior cadres gave up their horses for the sick and wounded. When food ran out, many comrades gave up what dried ration they had for the physically weak comrades. Not a few of them sacrificed themselves to save their comrades from danger. Between Red Army units of various routes, there were fraternal relationships, mutual support and encouragement and mutual study. They took the hardships and dangerous tasks and left the conveniences for their fraternal units. Sometimes, they would not hesitate to pay a high price to help their fraternal units out of danger.

During the Long March, the Red Army, adhering to Chairman Mao's teachings, conducted propaganda among the masses, organized and armed them along the way. It strictly observed the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention as well as the Party's nationalities policy, thereby drawing closer the relations between the army and the people and forming a brotherhood with such minority nationalities as I, Hui, Tibetan and Miao. Owing to this, wherever the Red Army went, it received the warm support and all-out assistance of the masses of people, and the units were able to rest, consolidate and expand, creating favorable conditions for annihilating the enemy and preserving the effective strength of the Red Army.

Thanks to the unity within the Party and the army, the unity between the army and the people, and the unity among the various nationalities, the three main forces of the Red Army "hailing from all corners of the country" formed a staunch fighting collective, which not only succeeded in crossing precipitous mountains and torrential rivers, snowy peaks and vast grasslands,

but also defeated the encirclement, pursuit and interception by several hundred thousand enemy troops, bringing the Long March to a triumphant close.

Today, as we are commemorating the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Long March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, a review of the history of the struggle between the two lines during the Long March is of very great educational significance to us.

Chairman Mao teaches us: "The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything." When the Party line is correct, we will have everything: if we have no men, we will have them; if we have no guns, we can get them; if we do not have state power, we will be able to seize it. If the line is incorrect, we may even lose what we already have. The history of the Long March fully proves the correctness of this thesis of Chairman Mao's. During the Second Revolutionary Civil War, under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, our Party built an army virtually from scratch and developed it into a red army of three hundred thousand men. Our Party established a Red political power from scratch and developed revolutionary base areas with a total population of ten million. However, just when the Red Army and the revolutionary base areas were developing victoriously, the "Left" opportunists represented by Wang Ming usurped the leadership of the Party and the Red Army and pursued an erroneous line, causing grave losses to the forces of revolution: a loss of almost a hundred percent in the White areas and a 90 percent loss in the Red areas. If the erroneous line were not corrected, the remaining few percent would have been lost, too. At such a critical moment facing the Party and the Red Army, the Tsun-i Meeting put an end to the rule of the erroneous line in the Party Central Committee and established the leading position of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in the whole Party. It was only then that the backbone forces of the Party and the Red Army were preserved and tempered, and the Long March victoriously completed. Due to the harm done by the erroneous line, the Red Army with three hundred thousand men was reduced to thirty thousand, and organized Party members were reduced from three hundred thousand to forty thousand. But after the erroneous line was corrected and Chairman Mao's revolutionary line implemented, though the Party and the Red Army were cut down in size, their quality was enhanced. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and relying on these backbone forces of the Party and the Red Army tempered by the Long March, our Party was able to lead the people of the whole country to defeat Japanese imperialism, destroy the 8 million-strong army of the Chiang Kai-shek dynasty and establish the People's Republic of China under the dictatorship of the proletariat. These indisputable historical facts tell us: no matter how hazardous and tortuous the course of the revolution, the revolution will develop and triumph when we implement Chairman Mao's line, but that when we depart from Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, it will suffer setbacks and fail. Therefore, we must consistently adhere to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and criticize all kinds of erroneous lines. In the historical period of socialism, we must likewise consistently adhere to the basic line set by Chairman Mao, persist in repudiating revisionism and capitalism in a

big way, make the greatest effort to build socialism, consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, prevent the restoration of capitalism and create the necessary conditions for the transition to communism.

In order to resolutely implement Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and criticize erroneous lines, we must distinguish a correct line from a wrong line. How? Chairman Mao teaches us: "Practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire." These are three principles by which we can distinguish the correct line from an erroneous one. The history of the Red Army's Long March fully bears out the unparalleled correctness of these three principles. During the course of the Long March, Chairman Mao, keeping to the principle of integrating Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution, correctly set the fundamental task of the Red Army's Long March as well as the general orientation of its advance, strengthened the great revolutionary unity and persisted in the principle of being open and aboveboard in conducting struggles within the Party, thereby guiding the Red Army to win great victories in the Long March and opening up a new phase for the Chinese revolution. On the other hand, Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-t'ao practiced revisionism politically and ideologically, while organizationally practicing sectarianism and splittism by resorting to conspiracy and intrigue. And both ended up in shameful defeat to become renegades leaving behind their odor for ten thousand years. The struggle between the two classes, two roads and two lines exists throughout the entire historical period of socialism, and in the future people like Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-t'ao, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao may still emerge. We must bear these historical lessons in mind and, under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, be good at discerning and defeating them.

Taking class struggle as the key link, the people of the whole country are at present resolutely implementing a series of important instructions issued by Chairman Mao regarding the study of theory, combating and preventing revisionism, promoting stability and unity, and pushing the national economy forward. They are struggling to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and build China into a modern and powerful socialist country. The task is magnificent, work arduous. "The Red Army fears not the trials of a distant march; to them a thousand mountains, ten thousand rivers are nothing." Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party led by Chairman Mao, we should foster this revolutionary tradition, maintain the same drive, the same revolutionary enthusiasm and death-defying spirit displayed in the revolutionary war period, and carry our revolutionary work through to the end.

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The Huai River--Past and Present

by

"Huai River's New Life" Compilation Group

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The Huai is one of our country's major rivers. About a thousand kilometers long, it rises in the T'ungpai Mountains in Honan Province, winds eastward, gathers up more than 500 large and small tributaries, merges into the Yangtze and empties into the Yellow Sea. Covering a total of 260,000 square kilometers in the four provinces of Honan, Anhwei, Kiangsu and Shantung, the Huai River Valley was one of the earlier regions of economic and cultural development in our country. However, due to the protracted rule of successive generations of feudal dynasties and the Kuomintang clique, the Huai River not only did not prove beneficial but, on the contrary, beset with serious havoc caused by man, the river basin became a famine area nine years out of ten, where "heavy rain meant great calamity, light rain meant small calamity and no rain meant drought;" the broad masses of working people led a painful life that left them destitute, homeless, cold and hungry.

The birth of new China brought some light to the people of the Huai River basin. For more than 20 years, particularly since the great proletarian cultural revolution, the people of the Huai River Valley have ceaselessly repulsed interference and sabotage from Liu Shao-ch'i's and Lin Piao's counter-revolutionary line; with glorious revolutionary tradition, they have been guided by Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and inspired by his great call that "the Huai River must be harnessed;" they have promoted the heroic spirit of "the foolish old man removing the mountain, and transforming China," the revolutionary spirit of "self-reliance" and "arduous struggle," they have basically brought water damage by the Huai River under control, while introducing water conservation there. From the foot of the T'ungpai Mountains to the shores of the Yellow Sea, and from the I-meng Mountain region to the Huaihai plain, they have set in motion one upsurge after another to control the Huai, and have won one victory after another; the whole of the Huai River basin has undergone and is undergoing colossal changes.

I. History of Serious Calamities

As far back as more than four thousand years ago, oracle bones in our country supplied us with records concerning the "Huai." Originally, it was a smooth-flowing outlet which led directly to the sea. The laboring people of ancient times already used the Huai to develop irrigation and ship transport, waging a struggle to subdue nature. However, because the Yellow River's age-old impact on the Huai, particularly the man-made abuse suffered during successive generations of the reactionary ruling classes, the Huai River became a notorious evil river in the world. According to statistics, in the 500 years between 1400 and 1900, 350 rather large floods occurred and a succession of more than 280 relatively serious droughts took place in the valley, often with drought and flood overlapping one another. In the half century before national liberation, the natural calamities in the Huai River basin became more serious still.

Historically, the Yellow River, north of the Huai River, had breached its dikes and changed course many times. In 1194 (5th year of Shaohsi in the reign of Kuang Tsung of Southern Sung, or 5th year of Mingch'ang in the reign of Chang Tsung of Chin), the Yellow River breached the dikes at Yangwu (within the present-day boundaries of Yüanyang county, Honan Province). It was a time when Chin and Sung were at war with one another and the place where the breach occurred was within the area occupied by the Chin people. In order to turn the evil of the Yellow River against the people of Southern Sung, the Chin rulers forced the Yellow River to overflow toward southeast and rush into the Ssu River; then they seized the river through of the Huai below Huaiyin. With the breach at that time, the greater part of the Yellow River flowed south into the Huai by way of the Ssu; the rest of the river still flowed north into the sea. By 1495 (8th year of Hungchih in the reign of Hsiao Tsung of Ming), the Ming ruling class, in order to prevent the flow of the Yellow River flood waters to the north and to protect the water transport (on the Grand Canal) for the royal house, closed the gaps in such places as Huanglingkang (to the southwest of Ts'ao hsien in present-day Shantung), and on the north bank they built the "T'ai Hang Dike" and caused the Yellow River to flow south through Hsüchou into the Huai. Thereafter, the Yellow River's flow to the north was cut off and the whole river entered the sea by way of the Huai (until the year 1855, when the Yellow River breached at T'ungwahsiang in the vicinity of present-day Lankao and once again turned northward, entering the sea by way of Lichin in Shantung). Over nearly 700 years in which the Yellow River displaced the Huai, it carried with it large volumes of mud and sand, and the yearly accumulation of silt blocked off the Huai River's access to the sea, causing chaos to its drainage system, raising its river bed and forming lakes with the water accumulated in the marshland. In seasons of high water, there was such great disparity in water releasing capacity between the upper and lower reaches of the river that the dikes were often breached, causing flooding calamities. The rulers of the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties, in order to keep the Grand Canal flowing freely and to maintain the Canal's transport of tribute grain for the imperial house, built the Kaochia Dike (that is, the great dike at Hungtse Lake), raised the water level of the Hungtse Lake, stored up the clear water of the Huai River, and attempted to use it to flush and cleanse the turbid water of the Yellow River so as to reduce the mud and sand that were silting up the Grand Canal. However, the Yellow River was strong and the Huai weak, and not only did they fail to alter the general tendency of the Yellow to accumulate mud and sand, but, on the contrary, caused natural calamities along the Huai River to become more and more serious. In 1680 (the 19th year of K'anghsi of Ch'ing), mountain torrents erupted in the upper reaches of the Huai, drainage in the lower reaches was clogged, the flood waters in the Hungtse Lake rose sharply and broke through the lake dikes, inundating the whole city of Ssuchou in a torrent of lake water. As a result of this inundation, the lake's accumulated water area grew larger and larger and the lake bed rose ever higher, but the outlets to the sea in the lower reaches were very small. Consequently, after the waters of the Huai broke through the main dike at Hungtse Lake in 1851, the flood waters passed into Kaopao Lake through the three rivers and flowed into the Yangtze; from then the Huai changed course to enter the Yangtze rather than the sea. But this waterway into the Yangtze proved too small

and relatively serious floods could not be drained off. For ages the reactionary ruling classes, instead of actively enlarging the flood water outlets along the lower reaches, built the five so-called "return to the sea dams" at dikes along the Grand Canal. Whenever the water of the Canal exceeded a certain level, the dams would be opened to release the water; this caused the Lihsiaho region to be flooded all the same. These so-called "return to the sea dams" were, in fact, "flood the fields" or "injure the people" dams.

After the 1911 Revolution, battles among warlords went on incessantly; by the time the reactionary Kuomintang clique came to power, the ruthless oppression of bureaucrats and landlords was intensified, and the Huai River suffered even more torment and devastation.

In 1929, the Kuomintang reactionary clique established a so-called "Huai River Conservation Board," but "dredging the Huai" was only short-lived and empty clamor. They blackmailed and extorted from the masses, impressing them for forced labor and levying taxes in cash and in kind, and the people along both banks of the Huai suffered the utmost in human misery. And those large and small "river officials," foremen, village elders and headmen reaped their ill-gotten gains by "conserving the Huai." In the name of "conserving," the Kuomintang reactionary clique issued government bonds for water conservation, cheated the masses out of 20 million silver dollars, and this vast sum for the most part found its way into the private pockets of the four families of Chiang, Sung, K'ung and Ch'en. The masses indignantly said: "Conserve the Huai, conserve the Huai, the more they conserve the more it is ruined." A popular folksong prevalent in the north Kiangsu region before the liberation profoundly laid bare the unvarnished truth as to this so-called "conserving the Huai" by the Kuomintang reactionary clique: The "good" intention of controlling the Huai is that the district leader builds a two-story house, the village elder builds one of tile, the headman one of brick while the common people are left to shed bitter tears.

In July 1931, the whole of the Huai River Valley experienced a torrential downpour; river waters rose suddenly, dams and dikes burst everywhere and a great portion of the land in the region was flooded. In Kiangsu, dikes to the east of the Li Canal burst, the Huai River flooded the Lihsiaho region. In Tangchunlou of Kaoyu county alone some 2,000 people were drowned. The whole of Hsinghua county was submerged overnight. Of the more than hundred families at Kuanchuang, save for five people lucky enough to survive in the tree tops, all were washed away by the flood waters. In the Canal section from Want'ou to Hsiennu Temple and on the main streets of Shaopo town, floating corpses were strewn everywhere. In some localities, snakes and people were forcibly lodged together on roofs and in tree tops and a good many people were simply biten to death by snakes. In this open sea, the cruel landlords and evil merchants reaped a mass fortune by hawking boats; to the stricken people frantically struggling to save themselves they cried out: "Three yang /dollars/ to be saved from the ocean, without money you can't come aboard the boat." The laboring people, who had long been scraped clean and wrung dry by the landlord class, had no money with which to buy their lives and could only wait to drown. After the flood

waters receded, those peasants who by luck or chance survived were already bankrupt, without resources and with no means to make a living; they could only run away to escape the famine, to drift about alone in strange villages. In this flood catastrophe, according to incomplete statistics, the inundated land in the three provinces of Honan, Anhwei and Kiangsu alone came to 64 million mow, with nearly 20 million people stricken by the calamity; there was no way to calculate the numbers who perished. It was truly a somber and heart-rending scene unfolded over the vast calamity-ridden region where "cottages stood like graves" and the "whole earth was littered with corpses."

In 1938, the iron hooves of the Japanese aggressive army moved into Hsuchou, and the feeble Kuomintang troops fled westward in panic along the Lunghai Railway. In order to save their own skin, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries recklessly blew up the Huayuankou Yellow River dike in the vicinity of Chengchou. The surging water of the Yellow River roared from the high ground and rushed south along the Chialu River, Ying River and other waterways and entered the Huai at Chengyangkuan. As the channels of these rivers were not capable of draining off the waters of the Yellow River flowing rapidly, the flat land was flooded over an area from 30 to 50 kilometers in width. The broad masses of working people once again suffered a scourge. Some 12.5 million people in the 44 counties (cities) in the three provinces of Honan, Anhwei and Kiangsu were left destitute and homeless and the number of people who perished exceeded 890,000. Honan bore the brunt of the flooding and suffered the most serious damage. To take Hsihua county for example: It was an open sea within its boundaries, houses collapsed and people and livestock drifted about. In the more than 700 villages in the whole county, more than 800,000 mow of land was flooded and more than 25,500 people drowned. From the breach in 1938 up to 1947 when the breach was closed, the Yellow River flooded every year. The waters of the Yellow River carried as much as 10 billion tons of mud and sand into the Huai River basin, making the region flooded by the Yellow River amount to 54,000 square kilometers. Within the flooded area, the river channel was blocked with silt, sand dunes were everywhere, reeds and shrubs thrived, wild rabbits ran in droves and locusts darkened the sky. The crimes of Chiang Kai-shek will never be forgotten by the people in the flooded areas.

II. The Huai River Must Be Improved

"The crowing of the cock signifies the advent of dawn." In 1949, new China was born. The people of the Huai River Valley, having passed through the most arduous hardships, threw off the yoke; having suffered more than enough trampling in the past, the Huai River turned toward a golden shining new milestone.

Our great leader Chairman Mao, with the greatest concern for the sufferings of the broad masses of people, issued a decision for permanent control of the Huai in the second year after the whole country was liberated. Owing to the frequency of calamities and the complex conditions characteristic of the Huai, Chairman Mao pointed out in his directive that the problem had to be fundamentally solved with an eye to long-term and far-reaching benefits; moreover, in light of the contradictions involved in harnessing the river's

upper, middle and lower reaches, he pointed out that we should proceed from the principle of unified and overall water control with Honan, northern Anhwei and northern Kiangsu joining hands in a collective effort to protect themselves. On October 14, 1950, Premier Chou personally presided over a Government Administrative Council meeting. At this meeting, in accord with Chairman Mao's directive, a resolution concerning the harnessing of the Huai was enacted which approved a plan to control the Huai, the "objective of which was to attain permanent control, a plan designed to both store and drain water." This plan required that control of the Huai take objective practice as the point of departure, so as to correctly handle the relationship between storage and drainage of water, doing both while storing what needed to be stored and draining what needed to be drained. The "plan to store and drain" was a revolution in the history of flood control and was the application of Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics to flood control work.

In the spring of 1951, just at the time when the people of the Huai River Valley were putting Chairman Mao's directive on permanent control of the Huai into effect and just as a high booming tide to control the river was rising, the central authorities sent a comfort team out with a brocade pannant upon which great leader Chairman Mao had personally inscribed the line "We definitely must improve the Huai River" for the vast army, a million strong, moving out to control the Huai and for the people of the whole valley. This great battle call from Chairman Mao fully embodied the firm determination of the Chinese people to fight heaven and earth and all class enemies through to the end; it gave concentrated expression to the ardent aspirations of tens of millions of people of the Huai River Valley through many generations. On May 15 of that year, after Chairman Mao's great call was published in Jen-min Jih-pao, it was like a spring breeze blowing over the whole land, and bringing incomparable encouragement and inexhaustible strength to the great masses of people who had suffered enough from the grief and hardships of the Huai River flooding in the old society. Everyone was moved to tears as they shouted aloud "Long live Chairman Mao! A long, long life to him!"

Under the inspiration of Chairman Mao's great call, hundreds of thousands of fighters rushed onto the battlefield to harness the Huai. The working class took the lead, bravely taking on the heavy burdens and fighting night and day on the front line to harness the Huai. The poor and lower-middle peasants, upward to a million, were the main force for the Huai River control project. With a profound proletarian feeling for the great leader Chairman Mao, and in a happy mood at having freed themselves from the feudal yoke, they joyfully rushed onto the battlefield to harness the Huai, just as they joined the army in previous years. The great Chinese PLA formed an enormous contingent for taking part in the battle at the water conservation project. A great number of revolutionary cadres came to the work site from all over the country to organize this great battle. Students of institutions of higher learning left their classrooms for this front line battle to control the Huai and took the road of combining with the workers and peasants.

The Huai River bubbled and churned for a thousand li. The red flags fluttering in the wind up and down the banks of the river were like a painting; everywhere people flowed to and fro like the tide and the singing, shouting and rumble of machinery echoed in the heavens. The huge army

braved wind and snow, dredged the river, repaired the dikes, shored up the embankments, built sluice gates, and unfolded an unprecedentedly tremendous peoples' war to harness the Huai. They resolved to uphold an indomitable revolutionary spirit, overcome all difficulties and to paint the newest and the most beautiful picture of the land around the Huai.

The road of progress is not smooth and there is struggle every step of the way. On the Huai River battleground, an acute struggle between the two classes, the two roads and the two lines has existed all along. In the early stages of harnessing the Huai, just when the undertaking was going ahead full steam, the renegade, traitor and scab Liu Shao-ch'i and his gang, making use of such revisionist slogans as "technology in command," "flood control for experts," and the "philosophy of servility to things foreign," interfered with and sabotaged Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line. The broad masses of people in the Huai River Valley, having a profound awareness of the bitterness of the old society and a strong feel for the sweetness of today, persisted, under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, in putting politics in command, carried out large scale mass movements, feared no difficulties, and through tenacious struggle subdued the interference from the counter-revolutionary revisionist line of Liu Shao-ch'i. In the space of a few short years, a group of large-scale reservoirs such as Fotzuling and Nanwan took shape; major flood control dams such as those at Hungtse Lake and north of the Huai were shored up and strengthened; and large-scale waterways to the sea, including the Hsin-i and Hsinshu rivers and the north Kiangsu trunk irrigation canals, were opened. Thus, initial steps were taken to bring floods, which caused the greatest harm, under control, and a solid foundation was laid for administering a still more comprehensive harnessing of the Huai River.

In 1958, under the guidance of Chairman Mao's general line -- "go all out, aim high, and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism," the heroic sons and daughters of the Huai liberated their thinking, broke with foreign conventions and, by relying on their own efforts, through plain living and hard work and by combining modern methods with indigenous methods in charge, brought about a new high tide for controlling the Huai. Never before had there been such spirited excitement, such boundless enthusiasm and such firm determination exhibited by the masses of people. It was at this time that Liu Shao-ch'i and company, turning their backs on objective laws, abused the activism of the masses and blindly ordered people about on a large scale. Due to interference from Liu Shao-ch'i's counter-revolutionary revisionist line, the erroneous method of "only storage, not drainage" was advocated and there emerged the erroneous tendencies to pursue high targets, go in for formalism, disregard unified planning and for each to go his own way. All of this was opposed to Chairman Mao's instruction on "Having water when there is drought and draining water when there are floods," and unified water control; it was diametrically opposed to Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics. In the acute struggle between the two lines, the broad masses boycotted Liu Shao-ch'i's counter-revolutionary revisionist line, persisted in consistently carrying out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, and scored tremendous achievements in the project for controlling the Huai. Construction of such

large-scale water conservation projects as the Pishihhang irrigated area and the project to divert the Huai into the I waterway and clusters of reservoirs in the upper reaches of the I, Shu, and Szu rivers was begun amid the war drums of the great leap forward.

After 1960, the Soviet revisionist renegades clique, taking advantage of the temporary difficulties encountered by our national economy due to natural calamities, perfidiously tore up contracts, recalled their experts and vainly attempted to strangle us. Chiming in with the international anti-China chorus of the imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries, Liu Shao-ch'i and his like, representing the interests of the already overthrown landlord-bourgeois classes in the country, maliciously attacked the three red banners, fanned an evil wind for restoring capitalism, and clamored that we must "retreat enough" and "dismount." As a result, some projects for harnessing the Huai that had already been built were not fitted with auxiliary works or were not managed or even abandoned and destroyed. Some projects which were in progress were suspended or abandoned. As for projects the masses wanted to build, all kinds of obstacles were placed in their way, and they were not permitted to start work. The people of the Huai River Valley, who possess a high degree of consciousness with respect to class and line struggles, carried out a resolute struggle with Liu Shao-ch'i's counter-revolutionary revisionist line and, in accord with Chairman Mao's great teaching that "We definitely must improve the Huai River," went against the black wind and evil waves, persisted in unremitting effort at water conservation and scored one victory after another. For example, in the Lin-i region, Shantung, mass movements to build reservoirs and embankments were developed in a sustained manner, and the first and second water pumping stations of the Chiangtu large-scale pivotal water conservation scheme in Kiangsu were victoriously completed. The fruits of the great leap forward were consolidated and developed, and the undertakings to harness the Huai continued to forge ahead.

During the great proletarian cultural revolution, personally initiated and led by Chairman Mao, millions upon millions of the revolutionary masses of the Huai River Valley, bearing in mind the reality of two-line struggle on the battlefront for harnessing the Huai, carried out large-scale exposure, criticism and reckoning of accounts against the crimes of Liu Shao-ch'i and company in sabotaging the harnessing of the Huai. They were determined to step up the pace for harnessing the Huai and to thoroughly transform the appearance of the Huai River Valley. In compliance with great leader Chairman Mao's teaching that "Water conservation is the lifeline of agriculture," they persisted in the direction of making water conservation serve increased production in agriculture and in the policy of "giving the main emphasis to small scale, auxiliary works rounding out big projects, and management by communes and brigades." They unfolded in depth a mass movement "to learn from Tachai in agriculture" and went all out to combine land improvement with water conservation in basic farm construction; they continued to build a group of large and medium-sized key projects, vastly raised the standards of flood control, stepped up and expanded the irrigated area, and completed the construction of a number of farms with high and stable yields free from drought and waterlogging. All of this gave a strong impetus to the development of agricultural production and increased the output of grain and cotton by a large margin. To be sure, the

struggle did not stop. The bourgeois careerist, conspirator, counter-revolutionary double-dealer, renegade and traitor Lin Piao, following in the wake of Confucius' "restrain oneself and return to propriety," disavowed the great proletarian cultural revolution, and vainly sought to usurp Party and state power so as to ultimately change the basic line and policies of the Party for the whole historical period of socialism as well as overthrowing the proletarian dictatorship and restoring capitalism. The broad masses on the battlefront to harness the Huai angrily denounced the towering crimes of the Lin Piao anti-Party clique during the great movement to criticize Lin Piao and rectify the style of work and movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. Citing the immense achievements made over more than 20 years in the work of harnessing the Huai, they forcefully refuted Lin Piao's vicious attacks against the socialist system. Citing the wisdom and strength displayed by the masses in their struggle to harness the Huai, they criticized Lin Piao's idealist view of history which advocated the "theory of genius" that some people were "born wise" and "the highest are wise and the lowest stupid." Using the facts of the two-line struggle on the battlefront to harness the Huai, they laid bare the evil and malicious intents of Lin Piao's "doctrine of the mean;" recalling their own family histories of sweat and blood, they forcefully brought the vices and evils of the old society to account and came to further understand that Lin Piao's "restrain oneself and return to propriety" was simply his desire to restore capitalism and repeat the tragic history of the Huai River Valley during the old society. The current movement to study the theory of proletarian dictatorship has still further aroused the activism of the Huai River Valley's people to harness the Huai for the revolution; a mass movement to harness the Huai is now vigorously unfolding throughout the valley in breadth and depth.

Practice in the struggle to harness the Huai has proved: "The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything." Whenever Chairman Mao's revolutionary line is consistently implemented, the work to harness the Huai goes forward; otherwise, there will be setbacks and defeat.

For the last 24 years, the people of the Huai River Valley, under the wholehearted concern of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao and under the leadership of Party committees at all levels, have carried out comprehensive harnessing of the Huai River, eliminating what is harmful and building what is beneficial, harnessing mountains and water, sand and alkalinity by "relying on our own efforts" and with "plain living and hard work." How are the floods brought under control? In accord with the plan for harnessing the Huai, in the upper reaches, besides soil conservation, they selected favorable topography in mountain gorges to build reservoirs and impound mountain torrents; in the middle reaches, in a planned way they used lake and low-lying areas near the main stream of the river to build control projects to impound and store up flood water on a temporary basis; in the lower reaches, they opened up waterways with routes to the sea and rivers and expanded the outlets for flood waters. Meanwhile, they erected dikes, large and small, everywhere and dredged and deepened the trunk and branch waterways. In order to do away with the scourge of waterlogging and alkalinity, the broad masses adopted comprehensive measures for dredging

rivers, widening the channels with drains and ditches, enclosing dams and building stations, controlling alkalinity, improving the soil, and so forth. In order to overcome the demon of drought, the Huai people, complying with Chairman Mao's great teaching that "water conservation is the lifeline of agriculture," opened up new water sources, developed irrigation, controlled and utilized surface water, vigorously developed underground water, and made use of the water of the Yangtze River. Today, throughout the basin more than 5,000 large, medium and small reservoirs, more than ten projects to impound and detain floodwaters in the lake marshes, more than ten spillways and large-scale man-made rivers to drain waterlogged areas have been completed. Mechanical and electric power drainage and irrigation equipment having a total of more than 5 million horsepower have been made available, 400,000 deep wells have been dug, a great many river beds have been dredged and dikes strengthened in projects coordinated with farmland water conservation. These have had a remarkable effect on the comprehensive use of flood control, drainage of waterlogged areas, irrigation, shipping and so forth. Put to the test by several big floods in 1954, 1956 and 1968, the main dikes in the lower reaches did not break or collapse; after it was strengthened in 1954, the Huaipei Grand Dike in the middle reaches was guaranteed safe; the frequent flooding situation of tributaries in the upper reaches was changed. The flood waters that brought damage for a thousand years were initially tamed by man. Of the 130 million mow of arable land that had suffered threat of flood and waterlogging in the past, over half now can drain off the normal amount of waterlogging, with the remainder showing varying degrees of improvement. The irrigated area in the whole of the valley has increased from 12 million mow in the early period of the liberation to more than 80 million mow. Particularly, the region north of the Huai, where originally there was only a million mow of irrigated area, has now increased the irrigated area several tens of times. Large tracts of saline-alkaline land and sandy barren soils have been transformed into fertile fields.

The colossal achievements in water conservation construction have given a great boost to agricultural production and have at the same time promoted the development of shipping, hydro-electric power generation, forestry, aquatic and other enterprises. More than 50 million mow of farmland with high and stable yield guaranteed in the event of drought and waterlogging have already been completed in the whole of the basin. In 1974, there was a 2.4-fold increase in total grain production compared with the early period of liberation and 64 percent of this increase was registered in the eight years since the great proletarian cultural revolution; there was a more than 5-fold increase in total cotton production as compared with the early period of liberation. Per-mow yield of grain in one-third of the counties and municipalities in the whole basin surpassed the target stipulated in the National Agricultural Development Program. Many old calamity-afflicted areas which in the past had to rely on the state for what they ate and spent, now make contributions to the state. The shipping business on the Huai River before liberation was extremely depressed; today, shipping mileage in the Huai River Valley has increased 6-fold since liberation, the volume of cargo carried has risen 37 times. There is an incessant flow of passenger and cargo

ships along the river. This has vastly promoted the interchange of commodities between town and country. Before the liberation, hydro-electric power was a blank piece of paper in the Huai river basin; now a group of large, medium and small hydro-electric power stations have already been built. Since the great cultural revolution, some regions, in light of local conditions, have developed hydro-electric power generation in mountainous areas or plains, thus furnishing motive force for agricultural and subsidiary production. What was once a bald and barren expanse of land north of the Huai is now mantled in green. Afforestation has not only served as a break against the movement of wind and sand and as a means to improve the soil, regulate the climate and safeguard dikes, but it has also produced a great quantity of fruit and a large amount of timber. In reservoirs and lakes aquatic breeding enterprises have been developed, and routes for fish, shrimp and crabs to return upstream have been established where channels enter the Yangtze or sea; these have played a splendid role in the development of fisheries.

III. Dawn Has Come Along Both Banks of the Huai

The changes that have come about along the 1,000-li Huai River have eloquently demonstrated the great truth that "only socialism can save China;" they have effectively refuted the slander against our country's socialist system by the bourgeois careerist and conspirator Lin Piao and by all reactionaries at home and abroad.

When people pass through the land of the Huai today, how can they not be filled with excitement and joy at the beautiful view that unfolds before their eyes!

North of the Huai and South of the Yangtze

"What is not south of the Yangtze is on a par with what is south of the Yangtze" is a verse with which people praise the great changes in the region north of the Huai.

The area north of the Huai is generally taken to be the broad plain north of the Huai which includes Honan, Anhwei, Shantung's southwest and the Hsuchou and Huaiyin regions of Kiangsu. The whole area is approximately 100,000 square kilometers in circumference which comprises about 40 percent of the Huai River Valley area. Before liberation, there was flooding, waterlogging, drought and alkalinity here; it was a perennially afflicted area with bad crops in nine years out of ten. Therefore, in the past, whenever people spoke of the area north of the Huai, it naturally conjured up thoughts of poverty and hardship.

After liberation, Huaipei /the area north of the Huai/ was transformed! Since the great proletarian cultural revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, still more world-shaking changes have occurred there! A great many conservation projects to harness the Huai that have come into being have brought about radical

changes in the agricultural production situation, which have, in turn, effectively triggered a large-scale increase in grain output and changed the appearance of this region where calamities had been frequent, production low and grain deficient. The barren, impoverished and deserted area north of the Huai has today become one of bumper harvest in grain and cotton, and the five kinds of enterprises are prospering. Such'ien county in Kiangsu Province and Yungch'eng county in Honan are two good examples of where great criticism and action stimulated major changes. Such'ien county is situated in the Huaiyin region and in the past was known as the big gate to the north, "the corridor of flood waters." Here the land was poor, drought and waterlogging were commonplace and it was well known as an impoverished county. At every high water season, the flood waters from the three big rivers of I, Shu and Ssu rushed down to inundate the fields and swallow up villages and farmsteads. After the founding of new China, the people of Such'ien enthusiastically plunged into the struggle to harness the Huai, took part in the project to "lead the I to regulate the Su," built the Loma Lake Reservoir to impound flood and rain water, built a great many farmland irrigation facilities and initially overcame flood and waterlogging calamities as well as creating favorable conditions for developing agricultural production. Under the impetus of the great proletarian cultural revolution, since 1969 the CCP county committee, adhering to taking the Party's basic line as the key link, has mobilized the masses to run water conservation work and carry out farm capital construction in a big way. The people of the whole county worked hard through several winters and springs and jointly did more than 70 million cubic meters of earthwork, dug more than 1,000 kilometers of canals, constructed 87 mechanical or electrical irrigation and drainage stations, built more than 600,000 mow of slopeland on the plain into ridged fields, built terraced fields on 40,000 mow of hilly and mountainous land, and erected embankments for 100,000 mow of farmland by the lakes and lowland. Some 70 percent of the land throughout the county has been brought into the network of water conservation. On the basis of treating water and improving the soil, they reformed the system of plowing, changing 700,000 mow of dryland crops planted once a year into fields rotating dryland crops with paddy rice and with three crops in two years. Grain has increased year by year throughout the county, and in four big steps over a span of four years there was an annual progressive increase of 90 million catties. The per-mow yield of grain in 1972 surpassed the "Program" target and total production has nearly doubled as compared with 1969. In 1973, production again increased by 110 million catties, and 120 million catties of commodity grain were supplied to the state. Nowadays people praise Such'ien as "the south of the Yangtze north of the Huai."

Yunch'eng county in eastern Honan was a perennially serious calamity region with damage caused by waterlogging, drought, saline and alkaline conditions. For a long time, the question of how to go about changing Yungch'eng's calamity-area image was the focus of the struggle between two ideas and two lines, which had all along been acutely going forward. The fierce storms of the great proletarian cultural revolution flushed away the muddy waters of revisionism and Yungch'eng came to revolutionary maturity. In the movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture,

the people of Yungch'eng did a great job of harnessing water and transforming the soil and quickly attained solid results. After a year of bitter struggle and hard work, in 1969 Yungch'eng did away with a situation where the per-mow yield of grain "hovered" around 100 catties and ended a long history of having to rely on grain purchase from the state, relief for cash expenditure and loans for production. For the last several years agricultural production has kept rising. In 1973, they conquered waterlogging, drought and other calamities rarely seen in history, and the total yield of grain increased by more than 330 million catties over 1965, with per-mow output increasing more than three-fold. Per-mow yield of cotton surpassed the "Program" target for two years in a row. In the last four years, they sold to the state more than 200 million catties of grain and more than 30 million catties of ginned cotton.

Today's Water-Bound Region

Along the shore of the Yellow Sea, to the east of the Peking-Hangchow Grand Canal, and between the trunk irrigation canals of north Kiangsu and the Tungyang Canal, there is a stretch of 18,000 square kilometers of marshy plain which is the Lihsia River region of north Kiangsu in the lower reaches of the Huai. This region is the place where marshland is lowest in the Huai River Valley; its surface area is two to three meters lower than the bottom of the Kaoyu Lake close by the west, and in the past it often came under threat of Huai River floods; to the east, again, the tide of the Yellow Sea stands one to two feet higher and the area has had its share of sneak attacks from the sea tides. According to historical records, in the recent hundred years before liberation, this area experienced a succession of every kind of calamity -- flooding, waterlogging, drought, saline tides, and tidal waves for a total of 51 times or an average of one calamity every two years. In the great drought of 1929 and the great flood of 1931, famine was a still greater catastrophe and thousands upon thousands of laboring people lost their lives.

Shortly after the whole country was liberated, the people of the Lihsia River region, under the leadership of the Party, with no faith in the mandate of Heaven and persisting in making revolution, unfolded a vigorous struggle to harness the waters. Successively, they demolished five unsuitable dams, strengthened the dikes along the canal, built the northern Kiangsu irrigation trunk canal and waterlocks at Hungtse Lake for the flood regulation of three rivers, thereby bringing waters of the Huai under preliminary control. Along the shores of the Yellow Sea, they built sea dikes, constructed tide blocking gates, and prevented the sea tide from pouring into the irrigated areas. After 1958, they successively completed engineering projects to expand and broaden the Grand Canal, and built the Tungyang Canal and the Chiangtu large-scale water conservation key project. On the basis of building a series of backbone projects, the various areas, in a manner suited to local conditions and through self-reliance, built a large group of medium and small-sized water conservation projects. Since the great proletarian cultural revolution, they have basically formed an integrated water conservation network.

Several thousand electro-mechanical drainage and irrigation stations are spread out over row on row of criss-crossed and interconnecting canals which enable several million mow of farmland to be irrigated and drained; the gravitational irrigation area along the Grand Canal and the irrigation trunk canal of northern Kiangsu has already expanded to more than 3 million mow. The development of water conservation construction has stimulated soil improvement and reform of the cropping system. The more than 4 million mow of fields which were frequently waterlogged and yielded a single crop a year have been transformed into high yield farmland with double cropping of rice and wheat. Where once this was saline-alkaline swampland, now good crops grow with glossy green leaves. The total grain output in this region has increased more than 3-fold compared with the early period of liberation and total cotton output has increased more than ten-fold. Grain production in many counties, communes and brigades has surpassed the targets stipulated in the "Program." This calamity ridden region of a thousand years has taken on a new look. Today, Lihsia Ho, with its criss-cross canals, sluices and dams everywhere, rows of willows along the banks, ships' sails passing in and out of view, the waves of summer wheat, and the lingering fragrance of autumn's unhulled rice, is a place of scenic beauty.

Oasis in a Desert

Nowadays, what most attracts the attention of people who pass through the Yellow River flooded region are the unbroken lines of forest belts and fruit orchards that have added to the boundless scenery of the whole area. The yellow sands and saline alkalis that covered the Yellow River flooded region years ago have now given way to green lush forests, blossoming grains and fragrant fruits.

Yenling is a county in the Yellow River flooded region. The whole county has a population of 400,000 and a million mow of arable land. In the past, half its land was sandy waste and marshland, more than 20 large and small rivers were always silted up with mud and sand and it was a major disaster area in eastern Honan. People used to describe the area as the victim of flood, drought, locusts and T'ang (the reactionary chieftain of the Kuomintang T'ang Po-en). In fact, apart from these calamities, there were also sand storms and saline-alkaline soils. Ever since Chairman Mao issued his great call that "We definitely must improve the Huai River," the people of Yenling county have taken on the revolutionary spirit of the foolish old man who moved the mountain and with shovel and hoe have carried out dredging, built ditches, ponds, sluice gates and dams everywhere for rivers large and small; basically, they have eliminated the threat of waterlogging and the saline-alkaline condition in agricultural production. They came to realize from practice that when water harnessing is not combined with afforestation, land preparation and soil improvement then it is unable to play the role it should. Beginning in 1962, the Yenling county Party committee mobilized people of the whole county to unfold large-scale afforestation. By the end of 1973, trees planted along "four sides" in the county numbered 75 million, or more than 180 per capita; a broad area of more than 82,000 mow was used for timber and fruit trees. Public highways and field roads for the whole county, more than 3,200 kilometers long, and 15 waterway dams,

250 kilometers in length, have been lined with trees reaching to the sky and hiding the sun. These great walls of criss-crossing green have fettered the sand storms, regulated the weather and directly provided agricultural production with great sources of fertilizers and promoted the development of agriculture. In the old society the laboring people passed the whole of their impoverished lives lacking food, fuel and a place to live. Today, forestry has developed, grain production increased and the livelihood of the people is improving day by day. The masses have not only built new homes one after the other but have also contributed timber to the state each year in support of socialist construction. Since the beginning of 1971, the county has sold 5 to 6 thousand cubic meters of lumber to the state each year. Owing to the ceaseless development of the collective economy, the pace of agricultural mechanization has been accelerated and at present, as compared with before the great cultural revolution, the standards of agricultural mechanization have been greatly improved throughout the county.

New Look of Mountain Regions

Mountain regions of the Huai River Basin account for 14 percent of the total surface area of the basin. For more than a thousand years the reckless ravaging of the mountain regions by successive generations of the reactionary ruling classes had laid waste the forestland, causing serious run-off of water and soil, and the soil layers grew more and more thin. Lack of rain brought death from drought, but with rain there were floods that were just as bad. As the Huai River is made up of large and small tributaries originating in these mountain regions, when mountain torrents erupt, they often give rise to destructive calamities for the people of the Huai River Valley. Retaining the water and soil in mountain regions and harnessing the Huai are therefore very closely related. If we are to do a good job of harnessing the Huai, then we must do a good job of controlling the flow of water from the mountains. Under the leadership of Party committees at all levels, the people of the mountain regions have called into play the revolutionary spirit of the foolish old man who removed the mountain, have unremittingly dug away at mountains and harnessed waters, while carrying out comprehensive control over the mountains, water, forests and fields. They checked the loss of water and soil, reduced the threat of mountain floods and on the whole were able to resist drought by sealing off the mountains to plant trees, diverting water with sluice gates and drainage channels, building reservoirs to store water, cutting through mountains to build canals, and erecting terraced fields.

The changes that took place at Lichiachai production brigade in Chunan county, Shantung Province, serve as a model for harnessing the mountain regions. Before liberation, the more than 5,000 mow of slopeland there were segmented and fragmented by the mountain ranges, rivers and ravines; the greater part of the land was studded with gravel and stone and the soil was poor and thin; it was unable to retain either water or fertilizers and in good years the grain yield per mow did not exceed 100 catties. In the past, who would have believed

that such poor soil could produce good crops? After liberation, the people of Lichiachai were determined to completely transform the land and make it into a green expanse of wheat, paddy rice, soya beans and peanuts. By 1957, the poor and lower-middle peasants of Lichiachai, by relying on collective strength, raised their arms to fight against the mountains and rivers; they levelled 11 hilltops, sunk 86 wells, filled up more than 300 gullies and more than 70 big swamps; they built 1,600 mow of terraced fields and the per-mow yield of grain sharply rose to more than 550 catties. On October 9 of that year, our great leader Chairman Mao wrote a brilliant directive: "Lichiachai is a good example of the foolish old man who removed the mountain and of transforming China;" this gave the people of Lichiachai incomparable strength and encouragement. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's brilliant directive, the people of Lichiachai were even more determined to transform heaven and earth, and once more drew up a plan to harness the mountains and rivers; by relying on their own hands and shoulders they tirelessly dug away at the mountains with hoe and shovel year after year. Production conditions were continuously transformed and grain output rose year by year.

In the winter of 1970, the people of Lichiachai, steeled by the great proletarian cultural revolution, further whipped up a new high tide in the mass movement "In agriculture, learn from Tachai." In December of that cold winter, the people braved fierce winds, fought against wind and snow, went out early and returned late, and working arduously, they took only 83 days to dig out more than 200 rocks, fill up 4 mountain gullies more than 280 meters long, 9 meters deep and 18 meters wide and build up more than 120 mow of level terraced land. At the same time, they also worked energetically on other conservation construction sites. In this way, through one winter and spring of arduous effort, they completed 8 major projects such as the "New Foolish Old Man" Reservoir with a waterholding capacity of 600,000 cubic meters, the Grape Mountain electric irrigation station with a range of 67 meters, stone channels and culverts a thousand meters long. With hard work they transformed production conditions and raised the output of grain; in 1971 the per-mow yield of grain crossed over the "Yangtze" and came to 865 catties. Following this, the Party branch and the masses drew up a new battle plan, and decided to build a large cross-over trough between Stoneman Peak and Phoenix Range Peak in order to solve the problem of irrigating the 700 mow of land beneath Grape Mountain. They made use of local raw materials, put local methods in command, promoted the revolutionary spirit of enduring hardship and hard work, and in six months erected a large cross-over trough 350 meters long and 10 meters high at Phoenix Range that enabled water from the East Wind Reservoir to climb up Grape Mountain, cross the trough and come right up to the peak. From then on, 90 percent of the brigade's arable land realized natural flow irrigation. Dedicated labors were transformed into abundant fruit. In 1972, the per-mow yield of grain for the entire brigade passed the 1,000-catty barrier, and it furnished a million catties of grain and oil-bearing crops to the state. In 1973, the per-mow yield came to more than 1,120 catties. Lichiachai has a folk song which accurately depicts the reality there: One red

heart and two hands, rely on our own efforts and we will have all kinds of things; make mountains bow and rivers give way, we will lead the dragon king by the nose.

Historically, 24 years is but a brief blink of the eye, but for the countenance of the Huai River Valley, it has seen an earth-shaking transformation. Today, millions of the sons and daughters of the Huai are now launching a vigorous upsurge of studying the theory of proletarian dictatorship; they are resolved, under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, to make new contributions toward winning still greater victories in permanently controlling the Huai and consolidating proletarian dictatorship.

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Study and Criticism, No. 1, January 14, 1976

Table of Contents

Two Poems - by Mao Tse-tung SPRCM No. 856

Study Theory of Proletarian Dictatorship, Grasp the Key Link, Class Struggle

Historical Experience Merits Attention - by Fang Hai SPRCM No. 858

Carry the Struggle Against Capitulationism Through to the End - by Lo Szu-ting SPRCM No. 862

Powerful Criticism of the Theory of Productive Forces -- investigation of four innovations in Shanghai's gloves industry - by Kung Hsüeh-ch'ing

Revolution Promotes High Yield in Agriculture -- investigation of Hsühsing Commune, Chiating County

Miscellaneous Essay: Raising Trees and Men - by Lo Ying

Strengthen Party Leadership, Unfold Mass Debate on Educational Front

Learn from Comrade K'ang Sheng's Spirit of Continuing the Revolution - by T'ang Wen SPRCM No. 858

Open-Door Education Is Fine - by Educational Revolution Group of Shanghai Normal University

The Fruit of Educational Revolution Must Not Be Obliterated -- investigation of medical teaching group of Shanghai No. 2 Medical College - by Hsü K'un and Wang Chih-chang

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revoution Brings Out My Revolutionary Youthfulness - by Ku Ch'ao-hao SPRCM No. 858

New Flowers Fill the Garden -- visiting the Educational Revolution Exhibition at Futan University - by Lu Shih-ch'ing, Teacher, and Chang Hsiao-lin, Student, Chinese Department, Futan University

Study Chairman Mao's Two Poems

Magnificent Poems That Combat and Prevent Revisionism — SPRCM No. 861

Revolution Can Change Everything - by Tu Hua-chang — SPRCM No. 858

Ambition Soars to the Sky, Song of Triumph Reverberates Beyond Heaven -- Thoughts on a recital of Chairman Mao's poems - by Shih Chuan

Researches in Modern History

Anti-Japan Hero Yang Ching-yü - by Ling Yung-k'ang, Young Worker of Shanghai Port, No. 3 Zone, and Fu Cheng-yü, Young Worker of Shanghai Port, No. 5 Zone

Notes on Wang Ching-wei's Betrayal of the Country (Part II) - by Shih Feng

Social Investigations

New Customs of Socialist Countryside -- investigation of Shanyang Commune, Chinshan County - by Investigation Team of 3rd Year Class, Department of History, Futan University

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